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Anti-Corruption

The Origins of Land Finance: Local Resistance and Top-Down Imposition

·502 字·2 分钟
Polihot 政治经济学 比较政治 中国研究 Land Finance Local Government China Fiscal Reform Anti-Corruption
CQ — pp. 1-20 2026-09-01 Original The Origins of Land Finance: Local Resistance and Top-Down Imposition Saul Kriger Wilson Abstract Abstract Land sales have been a significant source of revenue for Chinese local governments since the early 2000s. Contrary to popular belief, local governments did not turn to land finance to make up for lost tax revenues after the 1994 tax sharing reform. Rather, both before and after 1994, corrupt land sales were widespread, as officials sold land far below market prices in return for bribes. Even as the fiscal incentives for local governments to adopt land finance increased in the 1990s, state agents continued acting on their own personal interests rather than the institutional interests of local governments. Local governments only began to sell land at higher, market prices when an anti-corruption campaign launched by the central government made doing so a political imperative in the early 2000s. Local governments were much more responsive to political imperatives than to fiscal incentives.

Anti-corruption efforts and citizen-initiated accountability: evidence from administrative litigation

·608 字·2 分钟
Polihot 公共行政 中国研究 Anti-Corruption Administrative Litigation Citizen Accountability China Judicial Remedies
JPART — 2026-07-16 Original Anti-corruption efforts and citizen-initiated accountability: evidence from administrative litigation Weitao He, Haohao Li, Luning Liu Abstract Abstract Despite widespread recognition that institutional environment shapes citizen behavior, we have limited understanding of how anti-corruption efforts influence citizens’ willingness to challenge government actions through formal accountability mechanisms. This study examines how provincial leaders’ corruption convictions affect citizen-initiated administrative litigation in China, exploring the mediating role of judicial remedies and the moderating effect of local corruption environments. Drawing on comprehensive data including over 1.25 million judicial documents and corruption prosecutions, we find that provincial leaders’ corruption convictions significantly increase citizen accountability actions, with this effect mediated by enhanced judicial remedies. However, this direct relationship is substantially weakened when local corruption levels are higher. These findings reveal that anti-corruption efforts can catalyze citizen engagement with accountability institutions, but their effectiveness depends critically on the broader institutional context. This research advances public administration literature by revealing how anti-corruption efforts and judicial review function as institutional mechanisms that activate citizen-initiated legal accountability, reshaping incentive structures for citizen participation in government accountability.