PMR — pp. 1-32 2026-11-05 Original The difficulties of reducing administrative burden via the nonprofit sector: how sedimented governance stifles care coordination
Rene Wiedner, Alice Moore, Alec Fraser
JPART — 2026-11-02
Original The Effect of Clients’ Financial Resources, Mental Health, and Motivation on Frontline Workers’ Burden Reduction and Prioritizations
JPART — 2026-10-29
Original Every Mile Counts: Geographical Distance as Administrative Burden in Intellectual Property Services
Shenghua Lu
Abstract
Abstract While existing research has examined procedural and informational sources of administrative burden, this paper examines how organizational design choices about the geographic location of administrative authority institutionalize spatial burdens on firms. We leverage China's decentralization reform in trademark registration services as a natural experiment to test this theory. This reform reduced geographic distance by establishing local acceptance windows across the country from 2016 to 2019. Prior to this reform, trademark applications had to be submitted exclusively at the centralized Beijing office, imposing substantial geographic barriers on firms nationwide. Using a unique dataset covering over 37 million trademark applications from 294 Chinese cities, we employ a staggered difference-in-differences approach to estimate the causal effects of reduced geographic distance on trademark filings. We find that establishing local acceptance windows increased trademark applications by approximately 4.4 percent, or roughly 209,000 additional filings in 2019 alone. Moreover, the reform generated compound distributional outcomes: small and medium-sized enterprises responded more strongly than larger firms, and the new applicants drawn into the trademark system were concentrated in cities with thinner infrastructure. Mechanism analysis confirms that this increase is primarily driven by distance reduction rather than improvements in administrative efficiency or reductions in corruption. The findings provide large-scale causal evidence on the behavioral consequences of redistributing administrative service delivery across space, demonstrating that physical accessibility remains crucial for equitable service uptake even amid the digital transformation of administrative services.
PA — 2026-09-24
Original A Replication of “It is Not Merely About the Content: How Rules Are Communicated Matters to Administrative Burden”
PSJ 54/4 2026-09-23
Original From Policy Neglect to Research Agenda: Administrative Burdens and Donor‐Conceived Mobilization
PA — 2026-08-20
Original Face‐to‐Face With Administrative Burdens: Design Simplification, Emotional Costs, and Procedural Outcomes in Digital Welfare Applications
Fabian Hattke, Judith Hattke, David Hensel, Pamela Herd, Janne Kalucza, Donald P. Moynihan, Rick Vogel
PAR — 2026-08-19
Original To Add Insult to Injury: Exploring the Impact of Policy Inequity on Administrative Burden
Yongzheng Yang, Qingqing Zhang, Peng Liu
JPART — 2026-07-28
Original Institutionalized enforcement of administrative compliance: state regulator use of noncompliance burdens
Mingxu (Emma) Li, Daniel L Fay
Abstract
Abstract Administrative burden scholarship typically examines rules and regulations affecting access to public benefits during initial citizen–state interactions. Scholars agree that individual burdens function as “hidden politics” because policy changes during implementation through bureaucratic discretion. Less is known about bureaucratic behavior or hidden politics enforced on third-party service providers maintaining compliance. In this article, we address this by examining noncompliance burdens imposed on abortion providers to understand if regulators emulate peers’ behavior. Using an institutional theoretical framework and administrative records from the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (FAHCA) on abortion provider oversight, we construct a directed dyadic event history model using 1540 dyad-year observations to predict isomorphism or divergence of sanction activities across regulatory field offices. We find that regulatory field offices emulate behavior of others based on peer’s previous sanction behavior and oversight workload. We also find that regulators diverge from peers based on the regulatory conditions of their own jurisdiction.
JPART — 2026-06-05
Original Awareness, costs, and take-up of social benefits: evidence from a field experiment in China
Wenchi Wei, Xin Chen, Xing Ni
PA — 2026-06-01
Original A Replication of “Emotional Responses to Bureaucratic Red Tape”
Huaxing Liu, Cheng Huo, Ben Ma, Qing Huang, Z C Zhang