↓ 跳过正文

美国政治

From the Administrative Presidency to Personalist Consolidation: Trumpism and Executive Control of the Regulatory State

GOV 39/2 2026-04-08 Original From the Administrative Presidency to Personalist Consolidation: Trumpism and Executive Control of the Regulatory State William G. Resh Abstract ABSTRACT This essay investigates the evolving relationship between Trumpism and the United States regulatory state, focusing on how Donald Trump has reshaped American administrative governance to one of personalist consolidation. Drawing on scholarship of the administrative presidency, I argue that Trumpism represents a strategic fusion of structural deregulation in sectors like environmental protection, energy, and finance with robust state intervention in domains tied to a right‐wing populist definition of national sovereignty. Trumpism reflects a personalist style of governance rooted in the exploitation of institutional tools of the administrative presidency that have developed across both Democratic and Republican administrations over the past century. By situating Trump within the broader institutional evolution of executive power, I highlight how his manipulation of the regulatory state entrenches executive dominance and preserves an illiberal reform in governance through electoral legitimation paired with the erosion of liberal‐democratic accountability standards in administration.

Veto players and policy development

AJPS — 2026-04-07 Original Veto players and policy development Alexander V. Hirsch, Kenneth W. Shotts Abstract Abstract We analyze the effects of veto players when the set of available policies is not exogenously fixed, but rather determined by policy developers who work to craft new high‐quality proposals. If veto players are moderate, there is active competition between developers on both sides of the ideological spectrum. However, more extreme veto players induce asymmetric activity, as one side disengages from development. With highly extreme veto players, policy development ceases, and gridlock results. We also analyze effects on centrists' utility. Moderate veto players dampen productive policy development, and extreme ones eliminate it entirely, either of which is bad for centrists. But some effects are surprisingly positive; somewhat extreme veto players can induce policy developers who dislike the status quo to craft moderate, high‐quality proposals. Our model accounts for changing patterns of policymaking in the U.S. Senate and suggests that if polarization continues centrists will become increasingly inclined to eliminate the filibuster.

When Do Legislators Represent Their Constituents? Evidence from Roll-Call and Referendum Votes

JOP 88/2 pp. 854-866 2026-04-01 Original When Do Legislators Represent Their Constituents? Evidence from Roll-Call and Referendum Votes John G. Matsusaka Abstract This article develops a measure of representation that uses referendum returns to capture constituent opinion and applies it to 4,192 roll-call votes on 33 laws in 10 states. Roll-call votes were congruent with majority/median opinion in a district 66% of the time. Roll-call votes can be explained primarily by legislator ideology, with constituent opinion of secondary importance. The data do not show a reliable connection between congruence and competitive elections, term limits, media attention, and party pressure. The evidence generally supports the predictions of representation theories that emphasize selection of legislators that share constituent ideology and provides little support for theories that emphasize reelection incentives.

Unorthodox Lawmaking and the Value of Committee Assignments

JOP 88/2 pp. 716-731 2026-04-01 Original Unorthodox Lawmaking and the Value of Committee Assignments James M. Curry, Leah Rosenstiel Abstract (原文未提供摘要) 中文 非常规立法与委员会任命的价值 James M. Curry, Leah Rosenstiel 摘要 原文未提供摘要 关键词 非常规立法、委员会任命、国会、立法程序、美国政治

Executive–Legislative Policymaking Under Crisis

JOP 88/2 pp. 882-887 2026-04-01 Original Executive–Legislative Policymaking Under Crisis Nathaniel A. Birkhead, Jeffrey J. Harden, Jason H. Windett Abstract Does conventional wisdom explain policymaking during a domestic crisis on a novel issue? We consider executive–legislative interactions in the American states during the COVID-19 pandemic to address problems in the study of unilateral executive action. Empirical analyses of crisis policymaking often examine wartime presidents or localized natural disasters but confront difficulties in identifying the status quo policy. COVID-19 created a large-scale domestic crisis and a status quo that was known with relative certainty. We develop a canonical theoretical account of executive–legislative interaction and test it using COVID-19 executive orders issued and legislation introduced and passed during 2020 to 2022. Results show that governors’ proposals met expectations, but legislatures’ responses did not. Instead, partisanship and ideological factors, which crystallized over time, largely determined legislative policy choices. We conclude that standard theory does not adequately account for preference dynamics that might emerge due to delays between the executive’s proposal and the legislature’s response.

Candidate Positions, Responsiveness, and Returns to Extremism

JOP 88/2 pp. 681-697 2026-04-01 Original Candidate Positions, Responsiveness, and Returns to Extremism Mellissa Meisels Abstract (原文未提供摘要) 中文 候选人立场、回应性与极端主义的回报 Mellissa Meisels 摘要 原文未提供摘要 关键词 候选人立场、回应性、极端主义、选举回报、政治行为 DOI: 10.1086/738505 查看原文 →