美国政治

AJPS — 2026-04-07 Original Veto players and policy development Alexander V. Hirsch, Kenneth W. Shotts Abstract Abstract We analyze the effects of veto players when the set of available policies is not exogenously fixed, but rather determined by policy developers who work to craft new high‐quality proposals. If veto players are moderate, there is active competition between developers on both sides of the ideological spectrum. However, more extreme veto players induce asymmetric activity, as one side disengages from development. With highly extreme veto players, policy development ceases, and gridlock results. We also analyze effects on centrists' utility. Moderate veto players dampen productive policy development, and extreme ones eliminate it entirely, either of which is bad for centrists. But some effects are surprisingly positive; somewhat extreme veto players can induce policy developers who dislike the status quo to craft moderate, high‐quality proposals. Our model accounts for changing patterns of policymaking in the U.S. Senate and suggests that if polarization continues centrists will become increasingly inclined to eliminate the filibuster.

JOP 88/2 pp. 854-866 2026-04-01 Original When Do Legislators Represent Their Constituents? Evidence from Roll-Call and Referendum Votes John G. Matsusaka Abstract This article develops a measure of representation that uses referendum returns to capture constituent opinion and applies it to 4,192 roll-call votes on 33 laws in 10 states. Roll-call votes were congruent with majority/median opinion in a district 66% of the time. Roll-call votes can be explained primarily by legislator ideology, with constituent opinion of secondary importance. The data do not show a reliable connection between congruence and competitive elections, term limits, media attention, and party pressure. The evidence generally supports the predictions of representation theories that emphasize selection of legislators that share constituent ideology and provides little support for theories that emphasize reelection incentives.

JOP 88/2 pp. 716-731 2026-04-01 Original Unorthodox Lawmaking and the Value of Committee Assignments James M. Curry, Leah Rosenstiel Abstract （原文未提供摘要） 中文 非常规立法与委员会任命的价值 James M. Curry, Leah Rosenstiel 摘要 原文未提供摘要 关键词 非常规立法、委员会任命、国会、立法程序、美国政治

JOP 88/2 pp. 698-715 2026-04-01 Original Keep Winning with WinRed? Online Fundraising Platform as the Party’s Public Good Seo-young Silvia Kim, Zhao Li

JOP 88/2 pp. 867-881 2026-04-01 Original Incivility Does Not Exist: An Experimental Assessment on the Drivers of Incivility Perceptions and Their Effects on Candidate Evaluations

JOP 88/2 pp. 882-887 2026-04-01 Original Executive–Legislative Policymaking Under Crisis Nathaniel A. Birkhead, Jeffrey J. Harden, Jason H. Windett Abstract Does conventional wisdom explain policymaking during a domestic crisis on a novel issue? We consider executive–legislative interactions in the American states during the COVID-19 pandemic to address problems in the study of unilateral executive action. Empirical analyses of crisis policymaking often examine wartime presidents or localized natural disasters but confront difficulties in identifying the status quo policy. COVID-19 created a large-scale domestic crisis and a status quo that was known with relative certainty. We develop a canonical theoretical account of executive–legislative interaction and test it using COVID-19 executive orders issued and legislation introduced and passed during 2020 to 2022. Results show that governors’ proposals met expectations, but legislatures’ responses did not. Instead, partisanship and ideological factors, which crystallized over time, largely determined legislative policy choices. We conclude that standard theory does not adequately account for preference dynamics that might emerge due to delays between the executive’s proposal and the legislature’s response.

JOP 88/2 pp. 681-697 2026-04-01 Original Candidate Positions, Responsiveness, and Returns to Extremism Mellissa Meisels Abstract （原文未提供摘要） 中文 候选人立场、回应性与极端主义的回报 Mellissa Meisels 摘要 原文未提供摘要 关键词 候选人立场、回应性、极端主义、选举回报、政治行为 DOI: 10.1086/738505 查看原文 →

JOP 88/2 pp. 787-804 2026-04-01 Original Bureaucrats in Congress: The Politics of Interbranch Information Sharing Pamela Ban, Ju Yeon Park, Hye Young You Abstract （原文未提供摘要） 中文 国会中的官僚：跨部门信息共享的政治 Pamela Ban, Ju Yeon Park, Hye Young You

JOP 88/2 pp. 772-786 2026-04-01 Original Arms and Elections: Arms Deals with Autocracies, Defense Contracting, and US Presidential Elections Joshua Alley Abstract The United States makes more arms deals with autocracies during election years. US leaders sell arms to autocrats to bolster their electoral prospects by claiming credit for providing jobs and increasing defense contracting. Autocratic arms recipients have the political flexibility to order arms around elections and increase their security by taking arms. Three major pieces of evidence support this argument. First, I detail electoral cycles in arms deals between the United States and autocracies. I then show that arms deals increase defense contract awards in swing states. Finally, I unpack the process by showing how deal timing shifts after regime change, that US allies drive most of the autocratic arms deals cycle, and that the same platforms that move in arms deals increase swing state contracts. The argument and results detail an electoral motivation of US security cooperation with autocrats.

AJPS — 2026-03-11 Original Encouraging crossover voting in the 2024 presidential primary Hayley M. Cohen, Daniel B. Markovits Abstract Abstract Will voters participate in the primary of a party they oppose to prevent the nomination of a candidate they fear? Partnering with a political action committee, we conduct a first‐of‐its‐kind, large, preregistered field experiment ( N = 83,902) in the lead‐up to the 2024 Republican presidential primary in New Hampshire. A specialized get‐out‐the‐vote intervention increases turnout in the Republican primary among undeclared voters who are modeled as likely to vote for Democratic candidates in the general election. Our treatment increased Republican primary turnout in this sample by 1.6 percentage points while reducing turnout in the Democratic Primary by .5 percentage points. Supplementing our experiment with surveys before and after the primary, we estimate that each vote cast by Democratic‐leaning voters in the Republican primary had between a 78% and 95% probability of supporting the relatively moderate Republican primary candidate. We argue that voters are capable of sophisticated, risk‐mitigating behavior in primaries.