美国政治

PSJ — 2026-05-27 Original Polarization Entrepreneurs: Dividing to Conquer in the Trump Era Christoph H. Stefes, Kayla M. Gabehart, Kristin Olofsson Abstract ABSTRACT The policy process literature has long theorized about the role of policy entrepreneurs, whom Paul Cairney calls the “hero... who knows that the pursuit of ambitious aims such as ‘evidence‐based policymaking’ requires framing a problem, having a solution ready, and exploiting the motive and opportunity of policymakers to select it” (2018, 199). The research agenda on policy entrepreneurs also holds great potential for another type of policy actor that we aim to introduce into the policy process lexicon: the polarization entrepreneur. These polarization entrepreneurs aim not to resolve the specific policy conflict at hand, but to advance broader strategic goals, such as solidifying their ideological base, expanding their influence across several policy subsystems, or gaining electoral advantage. We introduce the polarization entrepreneur as a policy actor who strategizes within policy spaces in ways we have not yet fully comprehended or theorized. We thus draw on the Multiple Streams Literature (MSF), the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) literature, as well as the political rise of Donald Trump to theorize about how these polarization entrepreneurs operate. We suggest a research agenda that presents a wealth of opportunity for policy scholars to better understand the policy system of our day.

PAR 86/5 pp. 1225-1234 2026-05-19 Original How Was Democracy Under the Administrative Presidency Supposed to Work? Ben Merriman Abstract ABSTRACT Aggressive use of the administrative power of the presidency is a major source of public administrative concern about the health of American democracy. Many of these powers stem from executive branch reorganization in the late 1930s, which was conceived and implemented by founding figures in the modern field. Fear for democracy defined reorganization. Reorganizers elaborated a working theory about the conditions under which strong presidential administration could preserve and strengthen democracy: structured internal friction in the executive branch to recreate traditional checks on administrative conduct; identification and promotion of a corps of socially and politically astute administrators; and a watchful Congress. This design relied on a political approach to administration that created few managerial or legal safeguards. As subsequent polarization has altered the political order under which executive reorganization was conceived, the institutional powers of the presidency have emerged as a threat to democratic arrangements, rather than a bulwark.

APSR — pp. 1-24 2026-05-14 Original Attitudes Toward Electoral System Reform and Party System Change in the U.S. QUINTON MAYNE, SHANE P. SINGH Abstract Electoral reform efforts in the United States are widespread, yet little is known about how Americans evaluate alternative electoral systems or their consequences. We address this gap using conjoint and vignette experiments to study how Americans assess electoral reforms based on their implications for the number of parties and the degree of ideological polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives. Focusing on democratic voice, governability, and responsiveness, our designs emphasize party-system outcomes rather than technical institutional features that may be difficult for citizens to understand. We find that Americans are strongly averse to reforms that generate pronounced legislative polarization, even when it might be expected to enhance democratic voice. Findings pertaining to multipartism are more mixed, with some evidence that respondents respond positively to moderate departures from the two-party system. Perceived gains in voice and responsiveness do not generally compensate for losses in governability, except under arrangements that avoid polarization.

AJPS — 2026-05-05 Original Vote buying and negative agenda control: A problem for the study of money in politics Andre Van Parys Abstract Abstract Politicians, pundits, and ordinary citizens frequently argue that money has an outsized influence on US politics. Yet research on the effect of money on politicians' behavior finds limited effects, especially on voting behavior. I construct a formal model to show that these limited effects may be an artifact of the institutional powers of agenda setters, and the strategic nature of the data generating process. The model predicts that, under general conditions, vote buying against proposals can occur with no vote held, and that vote buying is most likely when uncertainty is high, the interest group and agenda setter are extreme, and the pivotal legislator is moderate. I argue that these conditions held during the 2021 negotiations over the Build Back Better Act. Using a synthetic control design, I test whether the swing voters in the Senate received more campaign contributions than they would have otherwise, finding evidence consistent with the model.

APSR — pp. 1-15 2026-05-05 Original Procedural Polarization: How Election Rules Shape Voters’ Confidence JOSHUA D. CLINTON Abstract Prior research demonstrates voters’ confidence in elections depends on whether their preferred candidate wins, but does agreement with the electoral rules being used also matter? Leveraging growing procedural polarization in election laws, public opinion data from 2008 to 2024, and a large-scale survey experiment conducted before the 2024 election, I show that agreement with election procedures matters for voter confidence beyond well-established effects related to partisan control and electoral outcomes. Observational and experimental analyses consistently reveal that voters are less likely to express confidence in election results conducted using procedures they oppose. The effects are particularly large for voter identification laws and among Republicans and independents. The findings underscore a tension in American federalism: as states increasingly adopt divergent electoral rules aligned with co-partisan preferences, partisan divides in electoral confidence may deepen. If so, procedural responsiveness to partisan preferences may undermine electoral confidence and, in turn, perceptions of electoral legitimacy.

JOP — 2026-04-28 Original Political Power of Bureaucratic Agents: Evidence from Policing in New York City Elisa Maria Wirsching Abstract To what extent can bureaucrats manipulate public service provision for explicitly political ends? Existing research highlights the ability of bureaucrats to influence governments through campaign contributions, endorsements, and election turnout. I explore a more fundamental mechanism: bureaucrats strategically shirking responsibil ities to leverage voters. Politicians rely on bureaucrats to achieve policy goals, which grants bureaucrats considerable leverage. When bureaucrats deviate in preferences from politicians and are politically organized and independent, they can reduce ef fort to exert political pressure. I use data on New York Police Department (NYPD) 911 response times and council members’ preferences on the FY2021 $1 billion cut to the NYPD’s budget. Employing difference-in-differences and spatial difference-in discontinuities designs, I find that police disproportionately reduced effort in districts of misaligned politicians by slowing response times. This study informs the theoretical debate on principal-agent relationships in government and highlights the importance of organized political interests to explain policing in US cities.

APSR — pp. 1-11 2026-04-24 Original Legislative Effectiveness, Progressive Ambition, and Electoral Success DANIELLE M. THOMSEN, SARAH A. TREUL, CRAIG VOLDEN, ALAN E. WISEMAN Abstract Are effective state lawmakers more likely than ineffective ones to be elected to Congress? We draw on a new dataset of state legislative effectiveness scores from 1993 to 2018 to examine the relationship between lawmaker effectiveness and the decision to run for, and ultimately be elected to, the U.S. House of Representatives. We find that more effective state lawmakers are more likely to enter Congress than ineffective lawmakers. This pattern is due more to the progressive ambition of candidates than to voter decisions. Specifically, within citizen state legislatures, more effective lawmakers are much more likely to run for U.S. House seats than are their less effective counterparts. In highly professional state legislatures, however, more effective lawmakers are more likely to run for Congress only when presented with the opportunity of an open seat. Our analysis finds no relationship between a state legislator’s lawmaking effectiveness and their likelihood of winning primary or general House elections.

JOP — 2026-04-20 Original DC On My Mind: Voter Evaluations of Nationalized Policy Positions in State and Local Elections Derek Edward Holliday, Aaron Rudkin

PSJ — 2026-04-12 Original Limits on Terms, Limits on Control: The Effect of Chief Executive Term Limits on Bureaucratic Responsiveness David R. Miller, Daniel M. Butler

GOV 39/2 2026-04-08 Original From the Administrative Presidency to Personalist Consolidation: Trumpism and Executive Control of the Regulatory State William G. Resh Abstract ABSTRACT This essay investigates the evolving relationship between Trumpism and the United States regulatory state, focusing on how Donald Trump has reshaped American administrative governance to one of personalist consolidation. Drawing on scholarship of the administrative presidency, I argue that Trumpism represents a strategic fusion of structural deregulation in sectors like environmental protection, energy, and finance with robust state intervention in domains tied to a right‐wing populist definition of national sovereignty. Trumpism reflects a personalist style of governance rooted in the exploitation of institutional tools of the administrative presidency that have developed across both Democratic and Republican administrations over the past century. By situating Trump within the broader institutional evolution of executive power, I highlight how his manipulation of the regulatory state entrenches executive dominance and preserves an illiberal reform in governance through electoral legitimation paired with the erosion of liberal‐democratic accountability standards in administration.