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美国政治

The Punitive Dimension of Presidential Particularism

APSR — pp. 1-11 2026-09-24 Original The Punitive Dimension of Presidential Particularism LUKAS K. ALEXANDER Abstract Existing accounts of presidential particularism emphasize the targeted distribution of benefits to electorally valuable constituencies. This research note demonstrates that presidential particularism can also operate punitively, through the selective imposition of costs on constituencies that provided weaker electoral support for the president. I examine this dynamic through the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), a highly centralized and politicized agency created at the start of Donald Trump’s second term. Leveraging data on nearly 700,000 federal contracts linked to DOGE contract cuts and 2024 county-level election returns, I show that these cuts were systematically concentrated in counties that provided weaker electoral support for Trump. These patterns hold across contract- and county-level analyses. Together, these findings broaden theories of presidential particularism by showing that presidents may use administrative authority to impose costs on electorally oppositional constituencies. More broadly, I demonstrate how presidents can wield administrative power as a tool of partisan punishment.

The Politics of Criminalized Places: Aggressive Policing and Political Mobilization

JOP — 2026-09-14 Original The Politics of Criminalized Places: Aggressive Policing and Political Mobilization Daniel Naftel Abstract (原文未提供摘要) 中文 犯罪化地区的政治:激进警务与政治动员 Daniel Naftel 摘要 原文未提供摘要 关键词 激进警务、政治动员、犯罪化地区、政治行为、刑事司法 DOI: 10.1086/744063 查看原文 →

Durable majority gerrymanders: Where partisan gerrymandering can displace democracy

AJPS — 2026-08-10 Original Durable majority gerrymanders: Where partisan gerrymandering can displace democracy Maxwell Palmer, Benjamin Schneer Abstract Abstract We develop the concept of, and estimation tools for, durable majority gerrymanders : electoral district maps drawn to reduce an opposing political party's probability of winning a majority in a legislative chamber. Directly interpretable, forward‐looking, and motivated by the democratic principle that a party in power should have some chance of losing it, this measure provides new insights into the role of redistricting in state legislative elections. We show that, when map drawers are unconstrained, the ability to create durable majorities is so widespread that at least one party in every state can draw a map where a majority of legislative districts withstand almost any likely future electoral swing. Enacted maps are less durable due to a combination of underlying geography, voter partisanship, and state‐level guidelines. This paper provides the theoretical framework and empirical tools to understand which gerrymandered maps enable state‐level majorities to emerge and to endure.