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Imperial Aid and Tax Mobilization in Late Colonial Africa

APSR — pp. 1-21 2026-09-21 Original Imperial Aid and Tax Mobilization in Late Colonial Africa DIDAC QUERALT Abstract In 1929, the British Empire launched a four-decade development initiative to modernize colonial economies without self-government. Known as the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, the program required colonial administrations to raise local taxes to cofinance development projects. This article shows that imperial aid expanded colonial taxation only after organizational reforms in the Colonial Service screened in officials who shared the metropole’s developmental agenda and made tax mobilization incentive-compatible with career advancement. Drawing on original data from 12 African colonies and extensive archival evidence, I show that aid increased tax revenues when patronage-based governors were replaced by career officers and promotion within the Colonial Service became conditional on fiscal performance. These findings highlight how bureaucratic incentives shaped the effectiveness of imperial aid and offer a new explanation for the expansion of fiscal capacity in late colonial Africa.

Welfare State Convergence or Robustness? Comparing Nonprofit Marketization Patterns Across Belgium, Sweden and the United States

PMR — pp. 1-30 2026-09-16 Original Welfare State Convergence or Robustness? Comparing Nonprofit Marketization Patterns Across Belgium, Sweden and the United States Ben Suykens, Johan Hvenmark, ChiaKo Hung, Aaron Van Steenlandt, Bram Verschuere

Brake or bridge? The dual impact of clientelism on hospital corporatization in Iran

PMR — pp. 1-32 2026-09-15 Original Brake or bridge? The dual impact of clientelism on hospital corporatization in Iran Maryam Zahmatkesh, Ian Kirkpatrick Abstract Public management reforms like corporatization often fail due to a lack of cultural and institutional compatibility, leading to divergence from globally prescribed reform models rather than convergence towards their intended managerial and organizational outcomes. While global templates prioritize managerial autonomy and efficiency, national ‘cultural ecologies’ filter these changes, sometimes creating deceptive window dressing to secure external legitimacy. This paper addresses a significant gap in current research by exploring how social relationships governed by clientelism – integral to the cultural ecologies of many countries – also impact on reform implementation. Using the Iranian healthcare sector as a case study, the paper investigates whether clientelism inevitably derails corporatization (the brake) or serves as an inherent cultural component that managers must navigate to achieve organizational goals (the bridge).

The seniority ceiling: Why some immigrants struggle to rise in political office

JOP — 2026-09-14 Original The seniority ceiling: Why some immigrants struggle to rise in political office Olle Folke, Johanna Rickne Abstract First-generation immigrants face a seniority ceiling that limits their political incorporation as candidates and officeholders. Career ladders that require qualification time in lower positions create structural barriers for this group. We use linked data from Swedish electoral ballots andadministrative records to examine this idea. A novel identification strategy isolates the effect of seniority-based promotion structures from immigrant-specific disadvantages by comparing immigrants’ incorporation patterns to those of internal movers—native-born Swedes whorelocate between municipalities. The seniority ceiling explains about half of the immigrant-native gap in holding political positions and almost the entire gradient of worsening incorporation at higher levels. We find strong selection effects at both the individual and group level. The seniority ceiling restricts incorporation at higher career steps for those with fewer opportunities to accumulate qualification time: those who arrived more recently or at older ages.