CQ 265 pp. 218-234 2026-03-05 Original “I Wish I Looked More Chinese”: Contemporary (Re)encounters with “Race” and Racialization for Chileans of Chinese Descent
AJPS — 2026-03-04
Original The economic foundations of powersharing: Evidence from Africa
Yannick I. Pengl, Philip Roessler
Abstract
Abstract How—and with whom—do rulers share power? Existing research focuses on the strategic logic of powersharing. In this paper, we analyze its economic foundations. Powersharing is modeled as a subnational fiscal contract, in which rulers allocate political representation based on constituencies’ revenue potential. Empirically, we combine historical geospatial data on different types of primary commodity production—mineral point resources and diffuse smallholder cash crop agriculture—with the ethnic affiliation of cabinet ministers across 15 African countries. We find that cash crop groups are overrepresented in post‐independence cabinets, while mining or food crop production does not translate into higher shares of power. Consistent with a revenue bargaining framework, we find that rulers traded political representation and targeted public services for indirect taxation of cash crops. Overall, this suggests powersharing serves not only as a means to distribute resources and co‐opt potential challengers but also to expand the pie and the rents at the ruler's disposal.
APSR — pp. 1-19 2026-03-03 Original Initiate and Elevate! How Political Parties Can Set an Agenda
DANIEL SANDVEJ ERIKSEN
Abstract
The study of political agenda setting is a cornerstone in political science. Within this literature, political parties are implicitly portrayed as being capable of proactively initiating discussions. However, this fundamental notion of party agency deserves further theoretical and empirical attention. In response, this article crafts a new model (the Issue Initiation Model) that opens the window into parties’ efforts to set an agenda and traces how they initiate and elevate their agenda. The model is tested on an original dataset covering more than 5.5-million tweets by political parties and MPs, coupled with over 750,000 news articles and 419,000 parliamentary questions in the United Kingdom and Denmark from 2015 to 2022. Results show how parties and their MPs can proactively redirect the attention of other actors through strategic planning and orchestrated actions. By theorizing and empirically testing the implicit notion that parties can proactively initiate discussions, this article has important implications for political agenda setting.
APSR 120/3 pp. 1167-1187 2026-03-02 Original The Cornered Mouse: Sanctioned Elites and Authoritarian Realignment in the Japanese Legislature, 1936–1942
JOP — 2026-03-02
Original Social Image, Networks, and Protest Participation
Ruben Enikolopov, Alexey Makarin, Maria Petrova, Leonid Polishchuk
Abstract
（原文未提供摘要）
中文 社会形象、社会网络与抗议参与
Ruben Enikolopov, Alexey Makarin, Maria Petrova, Leonid Polishchuk
GOV 39/2 2026-03-02
Original Bureaucratic Incentives and Government Responsiveness in China
Haemin Jee
Abstract
ABSTRACT Citizen complaints have long been considered an important channel of communication between citizens and officials in authoritarian regimes. Existing explanations for responsiveness to citizen complaints in China, however, do not adequately consider the role of local bureaucratic incentives as a driver of responsiveness. This paper seeks to explain local government responsiveness to citizen demands through this lens. Original data of citizen complaints and government responses from a Chinese prefecture and its subordinate counties demonstrate that lower level officials are more likely to respond to citizen complaints when monitored by their superiors. On the other hand, they are less responsive on unmonitored forums. Thus, oversight by higher level officials may be important in increasing actual government responsiveness; citizen complaints alone may not be enough to spur government action. While recent studies emphasize authoritarian accountability arising through quasi‐democratic institutions, this paper suggests incentives of local political actors may condition the effectiveness of these institutions.