JOP — 2026-04-17
Original Equal in Private, Unequal in Public? Coeducation and Sexism in the Soviet Union
Marco Giani, Krakowski Krzysztof
Abstract
（原文未提供摘要）
中文 私下平等，公开不平等？苏联的男女同校教育与性别歧视
Marco Giani, Krakowski Krzysztof
JOP — pp. 000-000 2026-04-17 Original Do Voters Value Relief over Preparedness? Evidence from Disaster Policies in Malawi
Felix Hartmann
Abstract
Growing evidence suggests that voters reward politicians for spending on disaster relief but not disaster preparedness. Yet, we know little about the mechanisms that underpin this pattern. Is it because voters generally value relief over preparedness? Or is it because voters expect preparedness policies to be less effective compared to relief policies? I test both mechanisms using a conjoint experiment in rural Malawi in which participants choose between two hypothetical candidates randomly varying attributes about their preparedness and relief policies. I find that respondents reward relief efforts over preparedness efforts, but they value effective preparedness similarly to effective relief. Additionally, respondents are more likely to reward preparedness efforts if they repeatedly observe that they are effective in mitigating disaster damages. Taken together, the evidence suggests that voters have pessimistic expectations about the effectiveness of preparedness policies but would reward preparedness similarly to relief if it is known to be effective.
CQ 266 pp. 418-434 2026-04-15 Original Solving Agency Problems in Chinese Universities: Academics in the Shadow of the Party’s Declared Leadership
CQ 266 pp. 365-384 2026-04-15 Original Governing through Visibility: Local Government Experimentation with Internet Celebrity Cities in China
Lu Liu, Yahua Wang
Abstract
Abstract The rise of internet celebrity cities has become one of the most striking phenomena in China since 2021. How do local governments respond and harness this trend to advance their development goals? This study focuses on local experimentation in creating such cities, drawing on the case of the Village Football Super League ( Cun chao 村超) in Guizhou. We identify policy entrepreneurship as a key driver of local experimentation and highlight three core strategies for creating internet celebrity cities: crafting local symbols, co-producing viral content and mitigating public opinion risk. Further analysis shows that this experimentation, by attracting massive public attention, simultaneously promotes economic growth, strengthens social cohesion, reinforces state narratives and projects China’s national image onto the global stage. Overall, the findings suggest an emerging model in which public attention becomes a core resource for local development and governance in China’s digital era.
APSR — pp. 1-13 2026-04-13 Original Reassessing Gendered Reactions to Terrorist Attacks: Slumps or Bumps?
YUSAKU HORIUCHI, MARTHA C. JOHNSON
Abstract
In a recent article published in this journal, Holman, Merolla, and Zechmeister (2022; 2024) report a decrease in support for U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May following the 2017 Manchester bombing, using data from the British Election Studies. Our analysis, however, reveals that once a linear time trend is considered, the bombing does not significantly affect public reactions. We replicate their study with Gallup World Poll data and likewise find no decline in May’s approval rating. Extending the analysis, we examine major terrorist attacks in African countries led by men and similarly find no rally effect. Together, these results cast doubt on terrorism’s capacity to trigger rally ’round the flag dynamics and challenge claims of a gendered pattern whereby women leaders face unique penalties in crises. We argue that broader comparative evidence is necessary before concluding whether citizens rally around, or retreat from, leaders in the wake of terrorism.
CQ 266 pp. 385-399 2026-04-13 Original From Contention to Clientelism: Evidence from the Ten-Year Fishing Ban in China
Jingping Liu
Abstract
Abstract How do ordinary Chinese people circumvent unpopular state policies? The existing literature primarily focuses on resistance against local bureaucrats. Drawing on ethnographic research on the ten-year fishing ban in the Yangtze River Basin, this article finds that fishermen (clients) continue to fish by maintaining patron–client relationships with the enforcers of the fishing ban (patrons). Ordinary fishermen seek the protection of enforcers through bribery. Enhanced state monitoring under the fishing ban facilitates bribery-based clientelism by weakening the fishermen’s everyday resistance, but it also constrains the power of enforcers by increasing the risk that their corruption will be discovered by upper-level authorities. For extremely poor fishermen, who are barely able to afford to pay bribes, their daily acts of resistance are morally justified by the need for subsistence safety, presenting enforcers with a dilemma: they must fulfil their law enforcement duties while also ensuring the survival of these individuals to maintain social stability. Therefore, cultivating a clientelist relationship with impoverished fishermen enables enforcers to manage their noncompliance, thereby balancing these conflicting goals. While clientelism protects people from unpopular policies to some extent, it more fundamentally strengthens the power of local bureaucrats, creating the potential for greater exploitation and larger-scale popular grievances in the long run.
GOV 39/2 2026-04-07
Original When the Regulatory State Meets Populism: Regulatory Agencies in Mexico
Mauricio I. Dussauge‐Laguna, Martin Lodge, Daniel Daza‐Vázquez
APSR — pp. 1-19 2026-04-06 Original State-Building in the City: An Experiment in Civilian Alternatives to Policing
CHRISTOPHER BLATTMAN, GUSTAVO DUNCAN, BENJAMIN LESSING, SANTIAGO TOBÓN
APSR — pp. 1-19 2026-04-06 Original Coethnics Covote in Africa: Studying Electoral Cleavages with a Covoting Regression Model
CARL MÜLLER-CREPON, NILS-CHRISTIAN BORMANN
JCC — pp. 1-18 2026-04-05 Original The Political Economy of Local Government Debt Expansion in China
Pan Liu, Jie Mao, Min Dai
Abstract
Since the 1990s, China has strengthened the Communist Party of China’s leadership over local People’s Congresses through a dual-appointment system, under which Party secretaries also serve as chairpersons of People’s Congresses. This article argues that this system enhances Party influence over legislative decision-making while further reducing institutional constraints, enabling local Party secretaries to pursue career-oriented agendas such as borrowing for infrastructure to boost economic growth. Under a growth-first development paradigm, this arrangement has fueled the rapid expansion of local government debt. Overall, these findings offer a political economy explanation for the dynamics of local government debt in China, and underscore the importance of stronger legal and institutional constraints on the dual-appointment system to mitigate local fiscal risks.