比较政治

JOP — 2026-04-28 Original Propaganda of Democratic Flaws and Its Impact on Regime Evaluations in Autocracies Rex Weiye Deng Abstract （原文未提供摘要） 中文 民主缺陷的宣传及其对威权政体中政权评价的影响 Rex Weiye Deng 摘要 原文未提供摘要 关键词 威权主义、政治宣传、政权评价、民主缺陷、政治合法性、公众舆论

PA — 2026-04-28 Original Governing the Local Digital Transformation: A European Comparative Perspective Sabine Kuhlmann, Justine Marienfeldt, Frederico Ganz Abstract ABSTRACT This study compares governance structures, policy formulation and implementation of administrative digitalization at the local level in three countries with different administrative traditions: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. A new analytical framework is developed that allows for a systematic comparison of administrative digitalization in different national contexts. To this end, we draw on concepts from comparative public administration and public policy analysis and assess whether and how national political and institutional contexts and ‘initial conditions’ influence local administrative digitalization. Three distinct models of governance are identified that reflect specific administrative traditions: a centralized and coordinated approach in France, a fragmented and multilevel system in Germany, and a centralized and decoupled model in the United Kingdom. Despite these differences, all countries priorities a policy‐making model based on voluntary participation and incentive systems in the digitalization of municipal administration. In terms of the results of the reforms, there are notable differences between countries: high digital maturity in the United Kingdom, medium and low levels of maturity in Germany and France. The continuation of capacity differences is also emphasized, with growing digital divides between municipalities.

AJPS — 2026-04-26 Original Experience and self‐interest: Diverging responses to global warming

APSR — pp. 1-20 2026-04-24 Original Vetting for Virtue: Democracy’s Challenge in Excluding Criminals from Office

GOV 39/3 2026-04-24 Original Varieties of Authoritarian Policymaking: Housing Policy Across Dictatorships Emilia Simison Abstract ABSTRACT Public policies are expected to vary across regime types, but this association remains inconclusive even when further differentiating within types of authoritarian regimes. Focusing on the theoretical mechanisms behind the expected associations between regime type and policy, I propose a novel framework to analyze policymaking and outputs across regimes. I claim that policymaking and how close its results are from the dictator's goal in any authoritarian regime depends on the extent and ways in which the space for contestation over policy is constrained. I apply this framework to an in‐depth historical comparative analysis of policymaking and outputs in three Latin American military‐led regimes. I show that differences in how the space for contestation was constrained in each explains differences in their policymaking processes and resulting policies despite the shared regime type, policy challenges and goals.

JCC — pp. 1-15 2026-04-24 Original Dual Authoritative Mediation: Policing and Community Governance in Urban China Gang Tian, Wen-Hsuan Tsai Abstract The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is employing mechanisms inspired by the ‘Fengqiao experience’ to mediate grassroots conflicts. Our findings show that in urban areas, community support officers from the People’s Police have played a critical role in this task. They liaise with residents’ committees and other relevant units to conduct ‘dual authoritative mediation’. This practice reflects the roles of the police as holders of state authority and paternal figures in the community, and it promotes the deep penetration of state power into grassroots communities. The role of the police in mediating disputes between residents is highly valued by the CCP, and China’s police force has been given more responsibility with respect to politics and law and the maintenance of stability than police in other countries.

PAR — 2026-04-21 Original Conditional Embeddedness: Local Government Attention Under Institutional Incentives Jiali Wang, Junming Zhu, Huibin Du Abstract ABSTRACT Government attention is crucial to policy change and outcome. For local agents, their attention is explained by various factors, and a thorough understanding is needed to integrate diverse perspectives. Combining vertical, horizontal, local, and personal influences, we formulate a conditional embeddedness framework for local agents. The framework explains that agents' attention is primarily directed by principals, but this directed shift is horizontally and locally shaped by political and economic contexts, conditional on agents' traits. Empirically, we test attentional responses of 328 prefecture‐level governments to an environmental reform in China. Results corroborate our hypotheses, showing that local government attention generally increases following a reform, but the increases vary due to promotion competition and firm dominance and are further moderated by mayors' education and work experience. The findings demonstrate the importance of interactions between contextual and individual features in the shifts of local government attention and their responsiveness in a principal‐agent relationship.

JOP — 2026-04-20 Original The Point of Attack: Where and Why Does Oil Cause Armed Conflict in Africa? Graeme Blair, Darin Christensen, Michael Gibilisco

GOV 39/3 2026-04-17 Original Trust Me, I'm an Expert: Evaluating the Relation Between Expertise and Trust in Regulators Bastiaan Redert, Edoardo Guaschino, Ixchel Pérez‐Durán, Yannis Papadopoulos, Koen Verhoest, Juan Carlos Triviño‐Salazar

JOP — 2026-04-17 Original Meritocracy and Autocratic Power-Sharing: A Historical Perspective Clair Yang, Yasheng Huang, Zhaomin Li Abstract This paper proposes meritocracy as a power-sharing institution in authoritarian regimes, particularly in weakly institutionalized environments. Contrary to what Enlightenment scholars believed, our evidence shows that meritocratic institutions were not uncommon in historical states and were often associated with absolute rulers. Using a formal model, we demonstrate that meritocracy benefits rulers by enabling them to co-opt high-ability agents, and it can remain credible even without third-party enforcement mechanisms. Unlike other power-sharing institutions, such as parliaments, which function more effectively under weaker rulers, meritocracy is more likely to emerge endogenously under strong rulers and remains self-reinforcing over time. We test these theoretical predictions using historical case studies and empirical analysis of a panel of 289 historical polities. The results confirm a positive association between meritocracy and autocracy. We believe that meritocracy can fill the gap in the literature to explain power-sharing in many historical absolute regimes.