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比较政治

Anti-corruption policies: examining and evaluating the integration of agencies and whistleblower systems

PMR — pp. 1-34 2026-11-06 Original Anti-corruption policies: examining and evaluating the integration of agencies and whistleblower systems Ina Kubbe Abstract This article interrogates dominant anti-corruption evaluation models by foregrounding the integration between Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) and whistleblower systems as a critical yet underexamined determinant of institutional effectiveness. Drawing on institutional theory, regulatory governance, and structured cross-country comparison, it develops a four-part typology of ACA–whistleblower integration regimes (complementary, substitutive, fragmented, and minimalist) based on document-based qualitative evaluation across 13 countries. The findings suggest that institutional coordination and interoperability, rather than the formal existence of anti-corruption institutions alone, are consistently associated with stronger enforcement capacity, greater institutional legitimacy, and higher public trust. The study challenges checklist-based global evaluation models that privilege institutional presence over institutional interaction and proposes an integration-centred framework for assessing integrity systems. By shifting attention from institutional design to institutional integration, the study offers a context-sensitive diagnostic approach for evaluating anti-corruption governance across diverse political and administrative settings.

Unpacking transatlantic income inequality

PNAS 123/45 2026-11-03 Original Unpacking transatlantic income inequality James P. Ziliak, Jonathan Cribb, Richard W. Blundell, James W. Banks, David Green, Antoine Bozio, Malka Guillot, Barra Roantree, Maxime Tô, Brindusa Anghel, Cristina Barceló, Jim Been, Patrick Bennett, Maximilian Blömer, Olympia Bover, Koen Caminada, Bart Capéau, Daniele Checchi A, Svetoslav Danchev, André Decoster, Bram De Rock Z, Kelly Foley, Giorgos Gatopoulos, Martin Halla, Bradley L. Hardy, Elena Herold, Laura Hospido, Tullio Jappelli, Egbert Jongen, Niki Kalavrezou, Arizo Karimi, Elizabeth Krause, Max Lay, Søren Leth‐Petersen, Charlotte Lucke, Immacolata Marino, Antonis Mavropoulos, Carlos Oliveira, Marten O. Palme, Tuuli Paukkeri, Grigoris Pavlou, Andreas Peichl, Pedro Portugal, Lukas Puschnig, Pedro S. Raposo, Ann-Christin Rathje, Terhi Ravaska, Craig Riddell, Marja Riihelä, Johan Sæverud, Kjell G. Salvanes, Annalisa Scognamiglio, Anne Steuernagel, Jonas Vanderkelen, Heike Vethaak, Nikos Vettas, Andrea Michaela Weber, Tom Wernham

Delegating Digital Policing: The Evolution of China’s Security-Industrial Complex

CQ — pp. 1-17 2026-11-03 Original Delegating Digital Policing: The Evolution of China’s Security-Industrial Complex Jingyang Huang Abstract Abstract How did China build its formidable digital policing apparatus so rapidly? While prevailing narratives emphasize top-down state direction, this statist perspective obscures critical local dynamics. This article argues that China’s security-industrial complex actually emerged from decentralized administrative pressures. Burdened by unfunded, time-sensitive central security mandates, resource-strapped local security agencies abandoned state-led technological development and outsourced to the private sector. Drawing on extensive field interviews (2017–2022) and policy analysis, this study traces the complex’s evolution through three interrelated mechanisms: the decentralization of internal security politics, the formation of hybrid public–private partnerships, and the varied transactional behaviour exhibited by capitalists, as well as between government and business, in a multi-layered system. By demonstrating how localized security projects inadvertently catalysed technological innovation, this research reveals the hidden market-driven roots of China’s security-industrial complex. It offers a novel framework for understanding how the party-state adaptively leverages capital for building a digital security state.

Emulate the Leader? Explaining Crisis Policy Change in the Canadian Federal System

GOV 39/4 2026-11-01 Original Emulate the Leader? Explaining Crisis Policy Change in the Canadian Federal System Liddell Hastings Abstract ABSTRACT In times of crises, do governments coordinate or do they make their own choices independent of what others do? Convergence of COVID‐19 policy at the beginning of the pandemic has been widely studied in federal countries. Yet, there is limited literature looking at the mechanisms that made policy between jurisdictions so similar. Utilizing Canada's decentralized federal system, this paper posits that convergence can be explained by a process of policy diffusion through emulation and a series of leader‐follower relationships. Drawing on the policy diffusion literature, this paper proposes three hypotheses for why some jurisdictions take on leadership roles in crisis policy while others follow. Synthesized as proximity, capacity, and urgency, these hypotheses are tested using a series of pairwise vector autoregressions identifying significant leader‐follower relationships between Canadian provinces. The findings suggest that policy primarily flowed from only a small number of large provinces (Quebec and Ontario), lending partial evidence, but also exceptions to the hypotheses proposed.

When Business Speaks, Legislators Listen: Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Brazil

APSR — pp. 1-16 2026-10-30 Original When Business Speaks, Legislators Listen: Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Brazil FERNANDO B. MELLO Abstract The influence of interest groups on policy making is a central concern in representative democracies, yet identifying causal effects remains a significant challenge. This article argues that legislators respond to informational cues about the economic importance and coalition breadth of interest groups. A field experiment in Brazil, which randomized the receipt of printed and WhatsApp messages from a pro-reform business organization, reveals that legislators are more likely to vote in favor of the group’s position when its membership size, economic importance, and sectoral reach are emphasized. A survey experiment with lobbyists supports this mechanism, showing that messages highlighting group characteristics increase legislators’ expected engagement and support. In-depth interviews with key political figures—including a former president, ministers, and deputies—further corroborate these findings. This study contributes to the literature on informational lobbying and cue-based persuasion by employing realistic experimental treatments and mixed-methods evidence.