↓ 跳过正文

政治经济学

Feeding the Coalition: How Presidents Use State Banks to Buy Legislative Support for Governability

GOV 39/2 2026-03-11 Original Feeding the Coalition: How Presidents Use State Banks to Buy Legislative Support for Governability Rodrigo B. DeMello, Carlos Pereira Abstract ABSTRACT This paper develops and tests a theory of how presidents use government agencies to manage legislative coalitions in multiparty presidential systems. We argue that agency decisions—particularly subsidized credit from state‐owned development banks—function as retail coalition goods that sustain legislative support. Legislators are more likely to back the president when agency resources benefit subnational politicians who are both partisan allies and vital to their reelection networks. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close mayoral elections in Brazil and loan‐level data from the National Development Bank (BNDES), we find that municipalities governed by coalition‐aligned mayors receive significantly more favorable loan terms. Linking these data to roll‐call votes, we show that legislators become more supportive of the president after loans are granted in their electoral strongholds managed by co‐partisan mayors. These findings reveal how distributive agency decisions translate into legislative support, integrating bureaucratic discretion into theories of coalition management.

Exiting Russia

APSR — pp. 1-18 2026-03-11 Original Exiting Russia RACHEL L. WELLHAUSEN, BOLIANG ZHU Abstract As of February 24, 2022, over forty thousand foreign-invested firms operated in Russia, a host state that initiated an interstate war—an exceptional shock in the modern era of economic globalization. Using company registration data, we document that after 18 months of war, 33.3% of foreign-invested firms had changed ownership or become inactive. We conceptualize exit as a politicized transaction in which sellers and buyers face external pressures and bargain over terms. Concerning pressures to sell, those in consumer-oriented industries were more likely to exit. On bargaining, we find Russian state interests consequential: foreign-invested firms already under Russian managerial control were more likely to exit, whereas those in Russian strategic industries were not. Despite extraordinary economic sanctions to isolate Russia, and surging social backlash against doing business in Russia, results imply that multinationals are at best unstable tools of economic statecraft, even in the midst of war.

The economic foundations of powersharing: Evidence from Africa

AJPS — 2026-03-04 Original The economic foundations of powersharing: Evidence from Africa Yannick I. Pengl, Philip Roessler Abstract Abstract How—and with whom—do rulers share power? Existing research focuses on the strategic logic of powersharing. In this paper, we analyze its economic foundations. Powersharing is modeled as a subnational fiscal contract, in which rulers allocate political representation based on constituencies’ revenue potential. Empirically, we combine historical geospatial data on different types of primary commodity production—mineral point resources and diffuse smallholder cash crop agriculture—with the ethnic affiliation of cabinet ministers across 15 African countries. We find that cash crop groups are overrepresented in post‐independence cabinets, while mining or food crop production does not translate into higher shares of power. Consistent with a revenue bargaining framework, we find that rulers traded political representation and targeted public services for indirect taxation of cash crops. Overall, this suggests powersharing serves not only as a means to distribute resources and co‐opt potential challengers but also to expand the pie and the rents at the ruler's disposal.

From Pricing Power to Autonomy: The Geopolitics of RMB-Denominated Oil Futures Benchmark

JCC — pp. 1-18 2026-02-27 Original From Pricing Power to Autonomy: The Geopolitics of RMB-Denominated Oil Futures Benchmark Alexandru-Stefan Goghie Abstract This article examines China’s introduction of RMB-denominated crude oil futures as an instrument of financial statecraft aimed at reshaping the geopolitical foundations of global oil pricing. While Brent and WTI dominate price discovery through their deep embedding in dollar-based financial infrastructures, China seeks to cultivate pricing power by relocating benchmark formation to domestic institutions and an RMB-denominated contract. The paper argues that this initiative is not merely a market innovation, but a strategic effort to reduce structural dependence on USD-centered benchmarks, mitigate exposure to US financial jurisdiction, and enhance autonomy amid intensifying geopolitical rivalry. By analyzing the architecture, evolution, and international uptake of the Shanghai INE contract, the article shows that pricing power constitutes a crucial and underexplored dimension of contemporary Chinese statecraft.