JPART — 2026-07-06
Original Playing with time: data manipulation within the performance evaluation cycle
Jiayuan Li, Zhibin Chen, Manqian Cui, Xuelian Zhang
Abstract
Abstract Understanding why public organizations manipulate performance data has become an essential theme in public administration scholarship. While prior research has extensively explored the individual and contextual drivers of gaming, the temporal dimension—specifically when manipulation occurs—remains remarkably underexplored. Moving beyond the impact of sporadic political events, this study examines the routine, institutionalized rhythms of the bureaucratic calendar. Utilizing satellite nighttime light data as an objective benchmark to detect distortion in officially reported GDP across 271 Chinese cities (2013–2020), we uncover a systematic, cyclical pattern of strategic gaming. Manipulation is substantial in the first quarter, consistent with political pressure for a “good start,” recedes during the middle of the year; and surges to its annual peak in the fourth quarter (Q4) as the final performance assessment looms. Furthermore, we show that this Q4 effect is contingent on local context: cities with lower fiscal autonomy and reduced marketization exhibit a significantly greater propensity to inflate year-end figures. By uncovering a routine form of manipulation embedded in bureaucratic practices, our study advances theories of performance gaming and sheds light on the strategic use of time in public management.
JOP 88/3 pp. 1258-1263 2026-07-01 Original Testing the Compensatory Theory: A Survey Experiment on COVID-19 and Redistributive Preferences in the UK
Mariana Alvarado, Pablo Querubin, Kenneth Scheve, David Stasavage
JOP 88/3 pp. 1202-1215 2026-07-01 Original Soft Power as Constituency Cultivation
Scott A. Tyson, Ethan Kapstein, Audrye Wong
Abstract
How do foreign agents, representing countries or other political actors, exert influence in another country? While scholars have directed considerable theoretical and empirical attention toward “hard power” (e.g., coercion [explicit or implicit] and corruption/bribery), far less consideration has been devoted to understanding the theoretical mechanisms associated with “soft” channels of political influence. We develop a novel theory of soft power as constituency cultivation whereby an actor (government or firm) makes a targeted investment in a foreign society with the objective of creating greater policy alignment among a set of politically relevant actors (the policy selectorate). We consider two factors that influence constituency cultivation, preexisting interest congruence and coordination (e.g., focal points), and extend our model to include corruption and other forms of bribery. We show how the potential for corruption/bribery can enhance the benefits from soft power, implying that corruption and soft power are complementary forms of influence.
WP 78/3 pp. 509-554 2026-07-01 Original Peasants and Parliaments: Institutional Foundations of Agrarian Reform in Eighteenth-Century Eastern Europe
Brendan McElroy
Abstract
abstract: An influential literature attributes Europe’s economic precocity to what might be termed “good” institutions, such as representative assemblies, which shielded property from governmental predation. This account fails to contend with the diversity of property rights in preindustrial Europe, many of which, like serfdom, were obstacles to growth. The author proposes a role for some—but not all—early representative assemblies in fostering growth by eliminating these “bad” property rights. An assembly’s capacity to extinguish property rights is a product of its decision-making efficiency, which in turn is associated with majority voting and centralized agenda control. The author tests these claims through a controlled comparison of progrowth agrarian reforms in the Russian Baltic province of Livonia and the Danish-ruled duchies of Schleswig and Holstein between 1795 and 1805, finding that the Livonian diet’s efficient organization was key to the successful transformation of serfdom. This analysis suggests that we must evaluate preindustrial representative institutions on the basis of their capacity to orchestrate complex exchanges of property rights and rents.
JOP 88/3 pp. 1145-1161 2026-07-01 Original Occupation-Specific Skills, Labor Market Context, and Preferences for Redistribution
Josep Serrano-Serrat
Abstract
Understanding who and when supports income redistribution is at the core of political economy literature. Nevertheless, even though social stratification literature understands skill specificity as a key element of social class, there is no consensus on the role they play in shaping political preferences. I elaborate a framework that allows understanding these contradictions. I argue that the effect of occupation-specific skills (OSS) on redistribution preferences is moderated by occupational context, being more negative the tighter the occupational labor market is. I propose two mechanisms related to labor market prospects that allow explaining this relation: expected wages and risk exposure. Using flexible interactive effects models and different rounds from the European Social Survey and the International Social Survey Programme I show the relevance of this new approach. This analysis might allow explaining distinct political coalitions depending on the economic context.
JOP 88/3 pp. 900-915 2026-07-01 Original Expectations, Gender Bias, and Federal Reserve Talk: Do Americans Trust Women as Central Bankers?
Cristina Bodea, Andrew Kerner
Abstract
(原文未提供摘要)
中文 预期、性别偏见与美联储言论:美国人信任女性担任央行官员吗?
WP 78/3 pp. 555-601 2026-07-01 Original Democratizing from Within: British Elites and the Expansion of the Franchise
Chitralekha Basu, Carles Boix, Sonia Giurumescu, Paulo Serôdio
CQ — pp. 1-17 2026-06-25 Original How Public Opinion Monitoring Services Are Reshaping Chinese Media
Haiyan Wang, Chunyan Huang, Liangen Yin
Abstract
Abstract Faced with the pressures of digital transformation, media organizations in China are undergoing a “think-tank turn,” in which Public Opinion Monitoring Services (POMS) are playing an integral role. This study uses POMS as a case to examine the digital transformation of Chinese media organizations and to explore the broader shifts in the political economy of Chinese media in the digital age. Combining in-depth interviews, fieldwork and analysis of secondary documents, this qualitative research study identifies the emergence of consulting as a “third role” of Chinese media, supplementing the traditional roles of news reporting and ideological propagation. This new role caters to the government’s need to govern the online space and manage public opinion through three primary operations: “timely firefighting” against dissident voices, “regular monitoring” of public opinion and the “periodic training” of information officials. In this context, POMS not only enable media organizations to navigate financial challenges but also significantly reshape their role and relationship with the state.
APSR — pp. 1-16 2026-06-23 Original Efficient Production without Domination: The Case of Labor-Managed Firms
IÑIGO GONZÁLEZ-RICOY
PAR — 2026-06-19
Original Selection Method, Partisanship, and Performance of Government Oversight Functions
Lang (Kate) Yang
Abstract
ABSTRACT This study examines how the selection of public sector leaders affects organizational outcomes, especially in oversight functions where independence is expected. Political economy literature suggests that elected leaders better respond to voter preferences, while appointed leaders possess more expertise. Drawing on public administration theories of political control of the bureaucracy, we posit that, regardless of the selection method, public sector leaders as agents are subject to the influence of political principals with authority over the selection process. When the principal's interest is not aligned with the public interest, as seen in government oversight functions, its influence could compromise the performance of the selected leaders. Focusing on state auditors, the study finds that on average, selection methods are not correlated with audit findings, but an auditor whose political principal shares the same party affiliation as the auditee (the state governor) is less likely to identify financial management deficiencies.