PNAS 123/33 pp. e2604542123-e2604542123 2026-08-10 Original Economic integration and upward mobility in Brazil
Radu Barza, Edward Glaeser, César A. Hidalgo, Martina Viarengo
PNAS 123/32 pp. e2619078123-e2619078123 2026-08-05 Original Hyperedge approximation for stochastic processes on higher-order networks
Anzhi Sheng, Alex McAvoy, Ye Tian, Silun Zhang, Angela Fontan, Joshua B. Plotkin
PNAS 123/32 pp. e2610891123-e2610891123 2026-08-04 Original Economic Preferences Predict Higher-Education Choices
Thomas Epper, Ernst Fehr, Kristoffer Balle Hvidberg, Claus Thustrup Kreiner, Søren Leth‐Petersen, Basit Zafar
JCC — pp. 1-19 2026-07-31 Original Poverty in Urban China 2012–2020: Applying an Income-Asset Joint Framework
PNAS 123/30 pp. e2602128123-e2602128123 2026-07-24 Original The social-class gap in negotiation: Lower-class individuals negotiate less and face more backlash
Ying Lin, Jackson G. Lu, Michele J. Gelfand
PNAS 123/30 pp. e2509768123-e2509768123 2026-07-20 Original The backfiring effect of weak AI safety regulation
Benjamin Laufer, Jon Kleinberg, Hoda Heidari
Abstract
Recent policy proposals aim to improve the safety of general-purpose AI, but there is little understanding of the efficacy of different regulatory approaches. We present a strategic model that explores interactions between safety regulation, general-purpose AI technology creators, and domain specialists-those who adapt the technology for specific applications. Our analysis examines how regulatory measures targeting different parts of the AI development chain affect the outcome of this game. Our model assumes AI technology is characterized by two key attributes: safety and performance. The regulator first sets a minimum safety requirement that applies to one or both players. The general-purpose creator then invests in the technology, establishing its initial safety and performance levels. Next, domain specialists refine the AI for their use cases, updating the safety and performance levels and taking the product to market. Resulting revenue is shared between the specialist and generalist. Our analysis reveals two insights: first, weak safety regulation imposed predominantly on domain specialists can backfire. While it might seem logical to regulate AI use cases, our analysis shows that weak regulations targeting domain specialists alone can reduce safety in a large class of parameterizations. Second, in contrast to the previous finding, we observe that stronger, well-placed regulation can mutually benefit all players. When regulators impose appropriate safety standards on both general-purpose AI creators and domain specialists, the regulation can function as a commitment device, leading to safety and performance gains, surpassing what is achievable under no regulation or regulating only one player.
AJPS — 2026-07-19
Original Electoral contests over voter beliefs
Dan Alexander, Alexander Evert
Abstract
Abstract Voter perceptions of candidates are the substrate on which campaigns act. It is costly, however, for voters to devote enough attention to politics to change their own perceptions of candidates. This paper views campaigns—and the time, effort, and money they expend—as subsidizing rationally inattentive voters' adoption of new beliefs about candidate platforms. We employ an all‐pay contest to model costly competition over voter perceptions. In our baseline model, campaigns seek to improve perceptions of their own candidates. In a variant, candidates engage in negative campaigning. Among other results, we observe platform divergence under more reasonable informational assumptions than previous spatial models, replacing candidate uncertainty about voters with voter uncertainty about candidates. This model serves as a bridge between behavioral research on campaigns and theoretical literature on elections, offering a richer set of empirical predictions while preserving the insights of the canonical Downsian framework as a limiting case.
JOP — 2026-07-15
Original Strategic Legislation under Weakened Judicial Review
Michael Beenstock
Abstract
(原文未提供摘要)
中文 司法审查弱化下的策略性立法
Michael Beenstock
摘要
原文未提供摘要
关键词
司法审查、策略性立法、立法行为、司法政治、权力分立、立法机关
DOI: 10.1086/743114
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JCC — pp. 1-22 2026-07-09 Original Chinese State-Owned Enterprise Workers at the Margins: Evidence from a Sichuan Case Study
Shan Huang
Abstract
This article examines workers’ changes in a Sichuan state-owned enterprise established during Third Front initiative. Taking qualitative research methods based on in-depth interviews and fieldwork, it demonstrates how SOE reforms reshaped workers’ capital resource and social status, transforming the formerly secure working class into wage-dependent labour through workers’ narratives on their work and life histories. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of capital and Marxist class analysis, the study tracks workers’ capital losses through welfare shrinkage, declining skill value, and work-unit network disintegration, explaining how these shifts represent changed labour relations, as institutional protection gave way to market control. The case points out widening divisions among workers, indicating a fragmented working class and a redefined class structure in post-reform China.
CQ — pp. 1-23 2026-07-06 Original The Emergence of Local Digital Platform Vehicles in China
Wenjia Song, Tianguang Meng
Abstract
Abstract As China’s land-financed development model faces increasing constraints, local governments have turned to public data as a new strategic resource. However, there is a governance puzzle with public data: how can the state mobilize a resource whose ownership remains legally and politically unresolved? This article examines Local Digital Platform Vehicles (LDPVs), hybrid corporations that have proliferated since the early 2010s. Drawing on data gathered from extensive interviews and an original nationwide dataset of LDPVs from 2014 to 2025, we argue that these entities enable local governments to exercise “control without ownership” by asserting authority over data flows rather than through formal property rights. Internally, control is achieved through co-shareholding, task approval, personnel and strategic partner selection, which bind market actors to local developmental objectives. Externally, LDPVs extract value by internalizing subcontractor profits, pursuing data financialization and shifting towards platform-based models. The article shows how China’s local developmental state is developing new organizational instruments for governance in the digital age.