政治经济学

CQ 266 pp. 291-308 2026-05-20 Original The Resilience of Self-reliance in China: Autonomy, Interdependence and Order-shaping Amy King, Wenting He Abstract Abstract The idea of “self-reliance” has endured in Chinese political discourse for nearly a century, transcending profound changes in China’s political, economic and strategic circumstances. Although it is frequently misinterpreted as economic isolation or autarky, the idea of self-reliance in China has always acknowledged the country’s engagement with the global economy. Drawing on the discursive institutionalist concept of ideational resilience, we show that self-reliance comprises three interlocking elements: autonomy, interdependence and order-shaping. While these sit in tension with one another, they have also accommodated one another since the earliest articulations of the idea. This tripartite structure has enabled Chinese leaders since the Republican era to reinterpret and usefully deploy the idea of self-reliance. Our findings underscore the resilience of Chinese foreign economic policy ideas, as well as the ideational logic behind Xi Jinping’s seemingly contradictory pursuit of technological self-reliance, open global markets and greater connectivity with the developing world.

GOV 39/3 2026-05-19 Original The New Politics of EU Industrial Policy: From the Regulatory State to a Transformational State Donato Di Carlo, Kathleen R. McNamara, Manuela Moschella

AJPS — 2026-05-05 Original Vote buying and negative agenda control: A problem for the study of money in politics Andre Van Parys Abstract Abstract Politicians, pundits, and ordinary citizens frequently argue that money has an outsized influence on US politics. Yet research on the effect of money on politicians' behavior finds limited effects, especially on voting behavior. I construct a formal model to show that these limited effects may be an artifact of the institutional powers of agenda setters, and the strategic nature of the data generating process. The model predicts that, under general conditions, vote buying against proposals can occur with no vote held, and that vote buying is most likely when uncertainty is high, the interest group and agenda setter are extreme, and the pivotal legislator is moderate. I argue that these conditions held during the 2021 negotiations over the Build Back Better Act. Using a synthetic control design, I test whether the swing voters in the Senate received more campaign contributions than they would have otherwise, finding evidence consistent with the model.

GOV 39/3 2026-04-29 Original The Supply Chain of Economic Ideas: Institutional Discourse and Policy Change in U.S. Economic Governance, 1945–2024

AJPS — 2026-04-26 Original Climate exposure drives firm political behavior: Evidence from earnings calls and lobbying data Christian Baehr, Fiona Bare, Vincent Heddesheimer Abstract Abstract When and how do firms engage in climate politics? We argue that regulatory concerns, business opportunities, and physical risks activate policy preferences and lobbying efforts. We measure firm‐level exposure to opportunity, regulatory, and physical aspects of climate change based on discussion in quarterly earnings call transcripts for 11,705 publicly traded firms between 2001 and 2023. We estimate the effect of climate exposure on climate lobbying instances (extensive margin), amount (intensive margin), and targets (political entities). We find that more exposed companies, especially in terms of opportunities and regulation, are more likely to lobby. The type of climate exposure, both absolute and relative to industry peers, dictates whether firms lobby, how much they spend on lobbying, and their choice of government target. Taken together, our findings demonstrate the importance of disaggregating firm‐level perceptions of climate impacts to understand patterns in political activity.

JOP — 2026-04-17 Original Meritocracy and Autocratic Power-Sharing: A Historical Perspective Clair Yang, Yasheng Huang, Zhaomin Li Abstract This paper proposes meritocracy as a power-sharing institution in authoritarian regimes, particularly in weakly institutionalized environments. Contrary to what Enlightenment scholars believed, our evidence shows that meritocratic institutions were not uncommon in historical states and were often associated with absolute rulers. Using a formal model, we demonstrate that meritocracy benefits rulers by enabling them to co-opt high-ability agents, and it can remain credible even without third-party enforcement mechanisms. Unlike other power-sharing institutions, such as parliaments, which function more effectively under weaker rulers, meritocracy is more likely to emerge endogenously under strong rulers and remains self-reinforcing over time. We test these theoretical predictions using historical case studies and empirical analysis of a panel of 289 historical polities. The results confirm a positive association between meritocracy and autocracy. We believe that meritocracy can fill the gap in the literature to explain power-sharing in many historical absolute regimes.

APSR — pp. 1-17 2026-04-07 Original Bureaucratic Resistance and Policy Inefficiency KUN HEO, ELISA WIRSCHING Abstract Poor public service provision creates an electoral vulnerability for incumbent politicians. Under what conditions can bureaucrats exploit this to avoid reforms they dislike? We develop a model of electoral politics in which a politician must decide whether to enact a reform of uncertain value, and a voter evaluates the incumbent’s reform based on post-reform government service quality, which anti-reform bureaucrats can undermine. Bureaucratic resistance for political leverage is most likely to occur when voters are torn between the reform and the status quo. Resistance lowers the informational value of government service for voters and can lead to policy distortions and accountability loss. When reform is moderately popular, resistance leads to policy inefficiency by preventing beneficial reforms due to electoral risks and inducing ineffective reforms by offering bureaucrats as scapegoats. Our model identifies a distinct mechanism of bureaucratic power and its implications for policy and accountability.

JCC — pp. 1-18 2026-04-05 Original The Political Economy of Local Government Debt Expansion in China Pan Liu, Jie Mao, Min Dai Abstract Since the 1990s, China has strengthened the Communist Party of China’s leadership over local People’s Congresses through a dual-appointment system, under which Party secretaries also serve as chairpersons of People’s Congresses. This article argues that this system enhances Party influence over legislative decision-making while further reducing institutional constraints, enabling local Party secretaries to pursue career-oriented agendas such as borrowing for infrastructure to boost economic growth. Under a growth-first development paradigm, this arrangement has fueled the rapid expansion of local government debt. Overall, these findings offer a political economy explanation for the dynamics of local government debt in China, and underscore the importance of stronger legal and institutional constraints on the dual-appointment system to mitigate local fiscal risks.

GOV 39/2 2026-04-05 Original Competition Law and Varieties of Capitalism in the Long Run: The Evolution of Institutional Complementarity, 1890–2010

WP 78/2 pp. 293-332 2026-04-01 Original The More Things Change: Legacies of Race and Segregation in South Africa's Land Reform Alex Dyzenhaus Abstract abstract: How does land reform occur and under what conditions do land transfers take place? The author argues that to understand contemporary market-driven land reform outcomes, one must examine the supply-side incentives of existing landholders in addition to demand-side explanations. Interviews and descriptive geospatial data from two provinces in South Africa show that landholders made land reform work for them and in doing so the redistribution of land reinforced past forms of segregation. These landholders' strategies were shaped by place-specific historical legacies of racial segregation: Some white farmers—in places in which spatial segregation fell on a rural-urban axis and economic segregation excluded black people from agriculture—used land redistribution to buffer their farms against predominantly black settlements. Other white farmers—in rural areas with dispersed spatial segregation and a large, but different, black farming sector—incorporated black farmers into the commercial value chain via land redistribution. The author's findings have implications for studies of redistribution in highly unequal contexts—that is, market-based redistribution can reinforce historical spatial and economic segregation.