政治经济学

JCC — pp. 1-19 2026-07-31 Original Poverty in Urban China 2012–2020: Applying an Income-Asset Joint Framework

PNAS 123/30 pp. e2602128123-e2602128123 2026-07-24 Original The social-class gap in negotiation: Lower-class individuals negotiate less and face more backlash Ying Lin, Jackson G. Lu, Michele J. Gelfand

PNAS 123/30 pp. e2509768123-e2509768123 2026-07-20 Original The backfiring effect of weak AI safety regulation Benjamin Laufer, Jon Kleinberg, Hoda Heidari Abstract Recent policy proposals aim to improve the safety of general-purpose AI, but there is little understanding of the efficacy of different regulatory approaches. We present a strategic model that explores interactions between safety regulation, general-purpose AI technology creators, and domain specialists-those who adapt the technology for specific applications. Our analysis examines how regulatory measures targeting different parts of the AI development chain affect the outcome of this game. Our model assumes AI technology is characterized by two key attributes: safety and performance. The regulator first sets a minimum safety requirement that applies to one or both players. The general-purpose creator then invests in the technology, establishing its initial safety and performance levels. Next, domain specialists refine the AI for their use cases, updating the safety and performance levels and taking the product to market. Resulting revenue is shared between the specialist and generalist. Our analysis reveals two insights: first, weak safety regulation imposed predominantly on domain specialists can backfire. While it might seem logical to regulate AI use cases, our analysis shows that weak regulations targeting domain specialists alone can reduce safety in a large class of parameterizations. Second, in contrast to the previous finding, we observe that stronger, well-placed regulation can mutually benefit all players. When regulators impose appropriate safety standards on both general-purpose AI creators and domain specialists, the regulation can function as a commitment device, leading to safety and performance gains, surpassing what is achievable under no regulation or regulating only one player.

AJPS — 2026-07-19 Original Electoral contests over voter beliefs Dan Alexander, Alexander Evert Abstract Abstract Voter perceptions of candidates are the substrate on which campaigns act. It is costly, however, for voters to devote enough attention to politics to change their own perceptions of candidates. This paper views campaigns—and the time, effort, and money they expend—as subsidizing rationally inattentive voters' adoption of new beliefs about candidate platforms. We employ an all‐pay contest to model costly competition over voter perceptions. In our baseline model, campaigns seek to improve perceptions of their own candidates. In a variant, candidates engage in negative campaigning. Among other results, we observe platform divergence under more reasonable informational assumptions than previous spatial models, replacing candidate uncertainty about voters with voter uncertainty about candidates. This model serves as a bridge between behavioral research on campaigns and theoretical literature on elections, offering a richer set of empirical predictions while preserving the insights of the canonical Downsian framework as a limiting case.

JOP — 2026-07-15 Original Strategic Legislation under Weakened Judicial Review Michael Beenstock Abstract （原文未提供摘要） 中文 司法审查弱化下的策略性立法 Michael Beenstock 摘要 原文未提供摘要 关键词 司法审查、策略性立法、立法行为、司法政治、权力分立、立法机关 DOI: 10.1086/743114 查看原文 →

JCC — pp. 1-22 2026-07-09 Original Chinese State-Owned Enterprise Workers at the Margins: Evidence from a Sichuan Case Study Shan Huang Abstract This article examines workers’ changes in a Sichuan state-owned enterprise established during Third Front initiative. Taking qualitative research methods based on in-depth interviews and fieldwork, it demonstrates how SOE reforms reshaped workers’ capital resource and social status, transforming the formerly secure working class into wage-dependent labour through workers’ narratives on their work and life histories. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of capital and Marxist class analysis, the study tracks workers’ capital losses through welfare shrinkage, declining skill value, and work-unit network disintegration, explaining how these shifts represent changed labour relations, as institutional protection gave way to market control. The case points out widening divisions among workers, indicating a fragmented working class and a redefined class structure in post-reform China.

CQ — pp. 1-23 2026-07-06 Original The Emergence of Local Digital Platform Vehicles in China Wenjia Song, Tianguang Meng Abstract Abstract As China’s land-financed development model faces increasing constraints, local governments have turned to public data as a new strategic resource. However, there is a governance puzzle with public data: how can the state mobilize a resource whose ownership remains legally and politically unresolved? This article examines Local Digital Platform Vehicles (LDPVs), hybrid corporations that have proliferated since the early 2010s. Drawing on data gathered from extensive interviews and an original nationwide dataset of LDPVs from 2014 to 2025, we argue that these entities enable local governments to exercise “control without ownership” by asserting authority over data flows rather than through formal property rights. Internally, control is achieved through co-shareholding, task approval, personnel and strategic partner selection, which bind market actors to local developmental objectives. Externally, LDPVs extract value by internalizing subcontractor profits, pursuing data financialization and shifting towards platform-based models. The article shows how China’s local developmental state is developing new organizational instruments for governance in the digital age.

JPART — 2026-07-06 Original Playing with time: data manipulation within the performance evaluation cycle Jiayuan Li, Zhibin Chen, Manqian Cui, Xuelian Zhang Abstract Abstract Understanding why public organizations manipulate performance data has become an essential theme in public administration scholarship. While prior research has extensively explored the individual and contextual drivers of gaming, the temporal dimension—specifically when manipulation occurs—remains remarkably underexplored. Moving beyond the impact of sporadic political events, this study examines the routine, institutionalized rhythms of the bureaucratic calendar. Utilizing satellite nighttime light data as an objective benchmark to detect distortion in officially reported GDP across 271 Chinese cities (2013–2020), we uncover a systematic, cyclical pattern of strategic gaming. Manipulation is substantial in the first quarter, consistent with political pressure for a “good start,” recedes during the middle of the year; and surges to its annual peak in the fourth quarter (Q4) as the final performance assessment looms. Furthermore, we show that this Q4 effect is contingent on local context: cities with lower fiscal autonomy and reduced marketization exhibit a significantly greater propensity to inflate year-end figures. By uncovering a routine form of manipulation embedded in bureaucratic practices, our study advances theories of performance gaming and sheds light on the strategic use of time in public management.

JOP 88/3 pp. 1258-1263 2026-07-01 Original Testing the Compensatory Theory: A Survey Experiment on COVID-19 and Redistributive Preferences in the UK Mariana Alvarado, Pablo Querubin, Kenneth Scheve, David Stasavage

JOP 88/3 pp. 1202-1215 2026-07-01 Original Soft Power as Constituency Cultivation Scott A. Tyson, Ethan Kapstein, Audrye Wong Abstract How do foreign agents, representing countries or other political actors, exert influence in another country? While scholars have directed considerable theoretical and empirical attention toward “hard power” (e.g., coercion [explicit or implicit] and corruption/bribery), far less consideration has been devoted to understanding the theoretical mechanisms associated with “soft” channels of political influence. We develop a novel theory of soft power as constituency cultivation whereby an actor (government or firm) makes a targeted investment in a foreign society with the objective of creating greater policy alignment among a set of politically relevant actors (the policy selectorate). We consider two factors that influence constituency cultivation, preexisting interest congruence and coordination (e.g., focal points), and extend our model to include corruption and other forms of bribery. We show how the potential for corruption/bribery can enhance the benefits from soft power, implying that corruption and soft power are complementary forms of influence.