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政治经济学

The policy construction of illegal markets: Exploring variation, success, failure, and unintended consequences

·604 字·2 分钟
Polihot 公共政策 政治经济学 Illegal Markets Harm Reduction Drug Policy Regulation Enforcement
PNAS 123/33 pp. e2515300123-e2515300123 2026-08-10 Original The policy construction of illegal markets: Exploring variation, success, failure, and unintended consequences Letizia Paoli, Peter Reuter Abstract Illegal markets, broadly defined to include markets where only specific transactions are illegal, are the consequence of policy, either a prohibition or highly restrictive regulation. They are generated by a variety of concerns, some moral, some pragmatic. They are often tied to legal markets, complicating the policy process. These markets are ubiquitous, rarely well controlled and little studied as markets. This article examines variations in illegality from the case studies in this Special Feature and synthesizes what can be learned about the success and failure of different approaches to controlling these markets. Control is often weak because powerful legal interests are opposed to tight regulation and, especially in markets with large underlying demand, rarely leads to substantial reductions in the targeted activity, unless draconian methods are used. As demonstrated by drug markets, tough enforcement can have large adverse collateral consequences. The paper concludes by suggesting that an extension of the harm reduction framework developed specifically for drug policy can be applied usefully to making policy choices in controlling other illegal markets.

The money laundering market: An economic analysis

·527 字·2 分钟
Polihot 政治经济学 Money Laundering Illicit Markets Information Asymmetry Market Structure Organized Crime
PNAS 123/33 pp. e2512080123-e2512080123 2026-08-10 Original The money laundering market: An economic analysis Joras Ferwerda Abstract Criminals launder their proceeds from crime, either themselves or by paying a professional, to disguise the link between the criminal, the crime, and the proceeds. This allows the criminal to spend the proceeds more freely and lowers the chance of receiving unwanted attention from the authorities. This paper investigates the structure and dynamics of the understudied market for money laundering services. The analysis reveals that this illegal market is demand-driven and fragmented, with different forms of laundering, each requiring different steps with varying levels of risk. High search costs, specialized money launderers, and uncertainties lead to local monopolies. Demand tends to be relatively inelastic because criminals eventually need laundering services to spend their proceeds. Local monopolies, inelastic demand, and poor information flows lead to relatively high prices for laundering. Trust issues and two-sided asymmetric information lead to a market with relationships that tend to last longer than generally expected in illegal markets.

The market for human smuggling: Structure, mechanisms, and paradoxes

·691 字·2 分钟
Polihot 安全研究 政治经济学 Human Smuggling Migrant Smuggling Criminal Networks Border Enforcement Market Structure
PNAS 123/33 pp. e2511019122-e2511019122 2026-08-10 Original The market for human smuggling: Structure, mechanisms, and paradoxes Paolo Campana Abstract Human smuggling is the facilitation of unlawful cross-border movement. It is primarily a commercial activity, offered as a service to willing, paying customers, and a large-scale market catering to millions seeking to circumvent mobility restrictions. Contrary to prevailing media and political narratives that depict smuggling as dominated by powerful and highly sophisticated criminal organizations, this study documents a fragmented, decentralized market composed of independent, localized actors operating through flexible, often temporary networks. These flexible arrangements, coupled with low barriers to entry, confer resilience and adaptability to the market, making enforcement difficult and resource-intensive. Intensified enforcement often produces unintended consequences, including heightened migrant vulnerability and increased reliance on smugglers. Despite regional differences, smuggling operations exhibit striking structural similarities shaped by local knowledge and monitoring costs. Such enduring structural characteristics exist alongside a growing role played by communication technologies, which are reshaping dynamics between service providers and customers. Ultimately, human smuggling remains a market fraught with paradoxes: Migrants face severe risks yet view smugglers as essential facilitators, while states confront the complex task of balancing border enforcement with humanitarian obligations and protections of vulnerable individuals.

The illegal market for sex in the United States: Insights from economic research

·480 字·1 分钟
Polihot 政治经济学 公共政策 Sex Work Decriminalization Illegal Markets Regulation United States
PNAS 123/33 pp. e2512375122-e2512375122 2026-08-10 Original The illegal market for sex in the United States: Insights from economic research Manisha Shah Abstract The illegal market for sex in the United States generates significant economic activity yet remains understudied due to its illegality and clandestine nature. This paper synthesizes existing empirical evidence documenting aspects of market structure, impacts of regulation, and notable changes over time. Criminalization, while intended to suppress the market, often exacerbates harms by displacing activity underground, increasing violence against sex workers, and elevating disease transmission risks. Natural experiments, including decriminalization episodes in Rhode Island and policy shifts in Europe, reveal that decriminalization can reduce sexually transmitted infections and violence against women. Additionally, technological shifts-particularly the rise of online platforms due to the internet-have reshaped market organization. These findings challenge conventional legal and moral frameworks and underscore the need for evidence-based policymaking to guide effective regulation of sex markets.

Stability and turbulence in illegal drug markets

·736 字·2 分钟
Polihot 政治经济学 公共政策 Illegal Drug Markets Drug Trafficking Fentanyl Cryptocurrency Supply Chain
PNAS 123/33 pp. e2512078123-e2512078123 2026-08-10 Original Stability and turbulence in illegal drug markets Beau Kilmer Abstract This article provides a primer on illegal drug markets, with a focus on the structure and nature of these markets and the enterprises involved. The markets for illegal drugs are large, with annual retail expenditures likely exceeding $100 billion in the United States alone. Many drugs are easy to produce, and their high value-to-weight ratios make them attractive to smugglers. Some features of illegal drug markets have been quite stable, such as the small size of retail purchases, in part because most sales are to people who use frequently and typically do not buy in bulk. Between production and consumption, most of these substances cross multiple borders-and often continents-and the mark-ups along the supply chain continue to be substantial. But there have been major changes over the past 15 y. While illegally manufactured synthetic drugs are not new, the proliferation of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids created an overdose crisis in North America and has other countries on high alert. The internet has also made producing and accessing a wide range of drugs and their precursor chemicals easier. The emergence of cryptocurrencies has created new opportunities to hide transactions and launder the proceeds. In addition to highlighting the stability and turbulence in these markets, this article offers ideas for future research and emphasizes the need for monitoring purity-adjusted drug prices, which is critical for understanding supply changes and evaluating interventions in these markets.