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政治经济学

Unpacking transatlantic income inequality

PNAS 123/45 2026-11-03 Original Unpacking transatlantic income inequality James P. Ziliak, Jonathan Cribb, Richard W. Blundell, James W. Banks, David Green, Antoine Bozio, Malka Guillot, Barra Roantree, Maxime Tô, Brindusa Anghel, Cristina Barceló, Jim Been, Patrick Bennett, Maximilian Blömer, Olympia Bover, Koen Caminada, Bart Capéau, Daniele Checchi A, Svetoslav Danchev, André Decoster, Bram De Rock Z, Kelly Foley, Giorgos Gatopoulos, Martin Halla, Bradley L. Hardy, Elena Herold, Laura Hospido, Tullio Jappelli, Egbert Jongen, Niki Kalavrezou, Arizo Karimi, Elizabeth Krause, Max Lay, Søren Leth‐Petersen, Charlotte Lucke, Immacolata Marino, Antonis Mavropoulos, Carlos Oliveira, Marten O. Palme, Tuuli Paukkeri, Grigoris Pavlou, Andreas Peichl, Pedro Portugal, Lukas Puschnig, Pedro S. Raposo, Ann-Christin Rathje, Terhi Ravaska, Craig Riddell, Marja Riihelä, Johan Sæverud, Kjell G. Salvanes, Annalisa Scognamiglio, Anne Steuernagel, Jonas Vanderkelen, Heike Vethaak, Nikos Vettas, Andrea Michaela Weber, Tom Wernham

When Business Speaks, Legislators Listen: Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Brazil

APSR — pp. 1-16 2026-10-30 Original When Business Speaks, Legislators Listen: Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Brazil FERNANDO B. MELLO Abstract The influence of interest groups on policy making is a central concern in representative democracies, yet identifying causal effects remains a significant challenge. This article argues that legislators respond to informational cues about the economic importance and coalition breadth of interest groups. A field experiment in Brazil, which randomized the receipt of printed and WhatsApp messages from a pro-reform business organization, reveals that legislators are more likely to vote in favor of the group’s position when its membership size, economic importance, and sectoral reach are emphasized. A survey experiment with lobbyists supports this mechanism, showing that messages highlighting group characteristics increase legislators’ expected engagement and support. In-depth interviews with key political figures—including a former president, ministers, and deputies—further corroborate these findings. This study contributes to the literature on informational lobbying and cue-based persuasion by employing realistic experimental treatments and mixed-methods evidence.

Trade Interdependence in the Modern Global Economy

APSR — pp. 1-23 2026-10-30 Original Trade Interdependence in the Modern Global Economy MICHAEL-DAVID MANGINI, STEPHEN CHAUDOIN Abstract Analyzing global trade interdependence requires an approach that incorporates fundamental features of the modern economy: intense trade in intermediates and the changing availability of alternative partners and substitute products. We use theoretical models of structural gravity to construct measures of dyadic dependence that directly incorporate these features. The measures describe (1) how much trade interruptions damage a country’s welfare and (2) how much additional trade it would take from their existing trade partners to compensate. We then show three important findings. First, the new measures differ from traditional measures based on aggregate trade statistics. Second, they show how, contrary to much common wisdom, the world has not marched inexorably toward greater interdependence. Third, we use China’s foreign assistance, as exemplified by the Belt and Road Initiative, to assess the consequences of one major government policy. Chinese assistance has increased partners’ dependence on China, without a reciprocal increase in Chinese dependence.

Can China Solve the Global Climate Catastrophe?

JCC — pp. 1-16 2026-10-29 Original Can China Solve the Global Climate Catastrophe? Mark Beeson, Jinghan Zeng, Qinyi Xu Abstract At a time of unprecedented environmental crisis, when the second Trump administration has abandoned even the pretence of combating climate change, ideas addressing this existential threat should be welcomed. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) may be the largest emitter of carbon pollution in the world, but it is also the world’s biggest investor in renewable energy. China is transforming its domestic energy profile, and facilitating a greater uptake of environmentally sustainable policies elsewhere. Given a demonstrated record of achievement and an apparent commitment to promoting environmentally sustainable policies at home and abroad, Chinese ideas about ‘saving the planet’ deserve to be taken seriously. This paper offers a critical review of these initiatives and assesses China’s prospects for leading in environmental policies.

Learning traps

AJPS — 2026-10-23 Original Learning traps Hassan Sayed Abstract Abstract When constituents are uncertain about whether leaders' policy preferences align with their interests, policy choices generate a trade‐off between payoffs and information. Leaders can experiment with their preferred policy, but if the outcome is bad, constituents learn this and threaten office removal. I use a repeated model of political agency to analyze how this trade‐off shapes long‐lived, term‐unlimited leaders' policy choices. When there is uncertainty about the optimal policy for constituents, leaders implement “learning traps”: spatially intermediate policies that halt learning about what the best policy is. They experiment only when their preferences are very likely to be aligned with constituents, a contrast to the “gambling for resurrection” logic ubiquitous in the literature. I provide a case study that examines how the 1861 reforms ending Serfdom in Imperial Russia represented the logic of a “learning trap” and illustrate additional applications of the model to political contagion and economic policymaking.

Linguistic intervention unlocks the economic gains of diversity

PNAS 123/43 2026-10-21 Original Linguistic intervention unlocks the economic gains of diversity Sheen S. Levine, Simon Siegenthaler, Bart J. Wilson Abstract Gains from trade generate prosperity, yet interpersonal exchange can falter along racial lines. We study incentivized experimental economies where participants must spontaneously initiate and sustain trading relationships with others whose race is visible. When the highest gains from trade require cross-race exchange, diverse economies underperform: welfare and specialization suffer as many retreat to autarky. This underperformance reflects not segregation into racial trading blocs, but a collapse in exchange. Opportunities for contact alone do not close the performance gap, which persists and even widens over time. To understand why, we turn to communication itself. Lower welfare is associated with less communication, fewer expressions of affiliation and achievement, and less explicit signaling of needs, deficits, and surpluses. We call this communicative misalignment: differences in shared-language use that raise search, bargaining, and coordination costs. A brief linguistic intervention equips participants with a communicative toolkit. It increases communication volume and the frequency of motivational and state-signaling language. Crucially, when gains depend on cross-race exchange, the intervention restores specialization and cross-race trade, closing the performance gap. Its effects are minimal when efficient trade need not cross race, indicating specificity rather than generic skill training. Language thus operates bidirectionally, both revealing the state of cooperation and causally shaping it. Although we examine racial boundaries, the mechanism may operate along other fault lines where interactional norms diverge, including hierarchy, geography, or culture. Language, a primary conduit of culture, can impede exchange when misaligned and facilitate it when aligned. This suggests a scalable micro-governance tool for reducing transaction costs.