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政治经济学

From past, persisting, and consolidating ecologies of segregation to ecologies of repair

·754 字·2 分钟
Polihot 政治经济学 公共政策 Segregation Urban Ecology Environmental Justice Racial Capitalism Reparative Planning
PNAS 123/38 2026-09-14 Original From past, persisting, and consolidating ecologies of segregation to ecologies of repair Isabelle Anguelovski, J. A. D. Connolly, Esteve Corbera, David N. Pellow, Fushcia-Ann Hoover, Jacqueline L. Scott, Marccus D. Hendricks, Christopher J. Schell

Beyond redlining: Gentrification, displacement, disadvantages, and exclusivity predict urban environmental and health inequities

·976 字·2 分钟
Polihot 公共政策 政治经济学 Environmental Justice Redlining Gentrification Urban Segregation Health Inequities
PNAS 123/38 2026-09-14 Original Beyond redlining: Gentrification, displacement, disadvantages, and exclusivity predict urban environmental and health inequities Idowu Ajibade, Kevan B. Moffett, Jason Maxfield, Kate Gregory, Adrian Bell, J. Voelkel, Todd Rosenstiel, Aaron R. Ramirez

The Origins of Land Finance: Local Resistance and Top-Down Imposition

·502 字·2 分钟
Polihot 政治经济学 比较政治 中国研究 Land Finance Local Government China Fiscal Reform Anti-Corruption
CQ — pp. 1-20 2026-09-01 Original The Origins of Land Finance: Local Resistance and Top-Down Imposition Saul Kriger Wilson Abstract Abstract Land sales have been a significant source of revenue for Chinese local governments since the early 2000s. Contrary to popular belief, local governments did not turn to land finance to make up for lost tax revenues after the 1994 tax sharing reform. Rather, both before and after 1994, corrupt land sales were widespread, as officials sold land far below market prices in return for bribes. Even as the fiscal incentives for local governments to adopt land finance increased in the 1990s, state agents continued acting on their own personal interests rather than the institutional interests of local governments. Local governments only began to sell land at higher, market prices when an anti-corruption campaign launched by the central government made doing so a political imperative in the early 2000s. Local governments were much more responsive to political imperatives than to fiscal incentives.

Embeddedness Under Fire: How Chinese Private Firms Navigate Conflict Risks in Northern Myanmar

·534 字·2 分钟
Polihot 政治经济学 安全研究 中国研究 China Myanmar Private Firms Conflict Risk Embeddedness
JCC — pp. 1-17 2026-08-27 Original Embeddedness Under Fire: How Chinese Private Firms Navigate Conflict Risks in Northern Myanmar Yaolong Xian Abstract As one of Myanmar’s largest sources of foreign investment, China has been exposed to the civil war that intensified after the 2021 coup. Drawing on a mixed embeddedness perspective and interview-based fieldwork, this article examines how Chinese private firms operate in Myanmar’s conflict-affected regions without formal state protection or legal guarantees. It argues that their resilience rests on embedding commercial activity within fragmented governance. Institutionally, firms align with non-state armed authorities, adapt across shifting jurisdictions, and benefit from protective norms tied to Chinese identity. Socially, they mobilize ethnic and kinship ties, intermediaries, and localized information networks. These mechanisms, though costly and imperfect, convert unstable environments into workable orders. The article contributes to Global China scholarship by foregrounding private enterprises as adaptive actors in conflict settings.

A theory of political divergence and gradual institutional change

·490 字·1 分钟
Polihot 比较政治 政治经济学 中国研究 Formal Theory Institutional Change Political Divergence Historical Political Economy Social Structure
AJPS — 2026-08-20 Original A theory of political divergence and gradual institutional change Clair Yang Abstract Abstract Why do some societies succeed in breaking away from historical traditions while others remain trapped? This paper proposes a formal theory to investigate the interaction between short‐run and long‐run political dynamics, highlighting a co‐evolution of political institutions and social structures. A society consists of various social groups, such as the rulers, the elites, and the commoners. Short‐run strategic considerations give rise to different coalitions among these groups, which determine not only political regimes but also redistribution policies. In the long run, these policies shape the accumulation of wealth and power, where small initial differences can lead to divergent paths of development. Finally, the paper examines three historical case studies on medieval Europe, imperial China, and the medieval Muslim world to illustrate potential pathways of long‐run political development.