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政治理论

What exploitation is

AJPS — 2026-03-31 Original What exploitation is Benjamin Ferguson, Peter Hans Matthews, David Ronayne, Roberto Veneziani Abstract Abstract We experimentally elicit views of what exploitation is from over 2,000 subjects. Our experimental design does not test existing theories of exploitation. Rather, it focuses on more fundamental properties that are the building blocks for these theories. We find, first, that exploitation is not a vacuous concept: Not all economic interactions are deemed exploitative. Second, contrary to several of the major approaches in the literature, both inequalities in the distribution of economic gains and asymmetric power relations contribute to exploitative relations. What matters most is the interaction of power and inequality: The effect of both elements together is significantly greater than the sum of each on their own. Finally, and perhaps remarkably, we found no major differences in exploitation ascriptions between experts and lay subjects. These findings have implications for the ethics of employment contracts, particularly in the context of sweatshop labor.

What is (de)politicization and what is wrong with it?

AJPS — 2026-03-25 Original What is (de)politicization and what is wrong with it? Dimitrios Halikias Abstract Abstract This article attempts to clarify the meaning of (de)politicization. Politicization sometimes refers to the inappropriate intrusion of partisan loyalties in nonpolitical social domains ( affective politicization ). Politicization can also constitute an ideal of civic agency and energy ( contestatory politicization ). In other contexts, politicization is meant as a kind of institutional corruption, in which government decisions are made for the sake of sectional advantage ( patrimonial politicization ). It can also refer to the imposition of controversial values judgments by ostensibly neutral institutions like the courts and bureaucracy ( values politicization ). These concepts raise divergent normative considerations of varying weightiness. This article motivates the potency of a fifth concept of politicization, which centers on the category of authoritative rule ( archic politicization ). It offers an ideal–typical contrast between political rule and depoliticized power, and it treats the distinct justifications for and objections to the substitution of depoliticized, impersonal reason for authoritative, political will.

What Is the Wrong of Capitalism? A Reply to Chiara Cordelli

APSR — pp. 1-8 2026-03-23 Original What Is the Wrong of Capitalism? A Reply to Chiara Cordelli NICHOLAS VROUSALIS Abstract Chiara Cordelli has recently criticized radical republicans for failing to ground a domination-based anti-capitalism. Cordelli argues that radical republicans “cannot prove either that domination under capitalism is less contingent than other wrongs, that capitalism’s distinctive wrong amounts to domination, or that such domination is unjust.” This article responds to Cordelli’s objections. I argue that Cordelli’s emphasis on capitalization does not threaten the non-contingency of capitalist domination; that capitalism’s distinctive wrong is domination and not alienation, and that this wrong is structural all the way down. Cordelli is right that capitalism involves alienation of our future to the vagaries of profit-maximization. But alienation is only a moment in capitalism’s fundamental wrong and ill—the domination of labor by capital.

When Realism Demands the Unfeasible Functional Binds, Functional Prompts, and the European Union

JOP — 2026-03-20 Original When Realism Demands the Unfeasible Functional Binds, Functional Prompts, and the European Union Carlo Burelli Abstract (原文未提供摘要) 中文 当现实主义要求不可行之事:功能束缚、功能提示与欧洲联盟 Carlo Burelli 摘要 原文未提供摘要 关键词 现实主义、可行性、欧洲联盟、功能束缚、功能提示、政治理论 DOI: 10.1086/741452

Possibilities for Social Equity Budgeting: Critical Insights From Bentham?

PA — 2026-03-09 Original Possibilities for Social Equity Budgeting: Critical Insights From Bentham? Laurence Ferry, Jim Haslam, Henry Midgley Abstract ABSTRACT Considering prior ways of seeing and practical mobilisations of Social Equity Budgeting (SEB), we suggest that prior conceptualisation, research and practice can be advanced by reflecting on insights from the philosophical and political literature on equity and justice. Here, we pursue such an approach and specifically contribute by considering how the writings of the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) provide critical insights informing possibilities for SEB. Our critical historical perspective, focused on the history of ideas in context, helps reinforce dimensions of today's prescriptive envisioning of SEB and indicate new insights and emphases in this regard around democracy and transparency (or publicity, to use Bentham's term). We here analyze progressive dimensions and possibilities in Bentham but also acknowledge and articulate the need to balance this with appreciation of critique of Bentham and more negative possibilities. Both dimensions have policy implications. Our analysis is facilitated by the notable (relatively) recent work of the Bentham Project at University College London (UCL) in seeking to publish the many previously unpublished writings of Bentham held in the UCL archive. Here, Gallhofer and Haslam's (2003) text, informed in part by detailed archival research into Bentham's then unpublished handwritten manuscripts, was a key starting point.

Scrutiny and Recall: Rousseau on Controlling the Executive

APSR — pp. 1-16 2026-03-03 Original Scrutiny and Recall: Rousseau on Controlling the Executive ARTHUR GHINS Abstract In recent decades, political theorists have drawn on historical thinkers to explore how political elites can be held accountable. Rousseau, however, is often dismissed as reducing accountability to elections and participation to occasional ratification referenda. This article challenges that view. While Rousseau expected an elective aristocracy to execute laws ratified by the people, he also identified two mechanisms—scrutiny and recall—through which citizens could control these representatives. After reconstructing Rousseau’s account, I consider how these mechanisms could be adapted to contemporary democracies. Focused on executive accountability, the model is particularly suited to presidential systems with directly elected presidents. It combines a national jury—a citizens’ assembly chosen by lot and tasked with examining presidential actions—with the possibility of a recall referendum. By uniting deliberative scrutiny with the power to remove the head of state, this approach offers an underexplored complement to recent anti-oligarchic institutional innovations based on sortition.