JCC — pp. 1-18 2026-04-21 Original Diplomatic Bifurcation: China’s Dual Narratives on the Russia–Ukraine War in Global Times
JCC — pp. 1-15 2026-04-21 Original China Plans for ‘Total War’: Developing the Capacity to Defeat the ‘Strong Enemy’ of the United States
JCC — pp. 1-16 2026-04-08 Original China’s Quasi-Mediation Diplomacy in the Middle East in the 21st Century
Mordechai Chaziza
Abstract
This study examines China’s quasi-mediation diplomacy in the Middle East as a limited form of conflict management. Rather than viewing mediation as dispute resolution, quasi-mediation is framed as a strategy for China to engage regionally while minimizing political and reputational risk. Through cases such as the 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement and China’s involvement in the Israel-Palestine conflict, the article argues that quasi-mediation allows China to signal responsible power, manage regional instability, and expand its diplomatic visibility, without taking on coercive leverage or implementation. The analysis reveals that China’s efforts are more about reputational signaling and risk management than conflict resolution. Ultimately, quasi-mediation reflects China’s global ambitions and the constraints of its non-interference policy in a multipolar world.
JOP 88/2 pp. 839-853 2026-04-01 Original Observable Bounds of Rationality and Credibility in International Relations
Andrew Kenealy, Trent Ollerenshaw, So Jin Lee
Abstract
In crisis bargaining scenarios, resolved states send costly signals to demonstrate a willingness to fight. Yet, public signals of resolve are issued by specific leaders, who operate with cognitive limitations in challenging decision environments. Drawing upon theories of behavioral economics, we develop a series of observable indicators plausibly connected to leader ability and difficulty of decision environment that we expect shape perceived signaler credibility. Effects, we argue, are due to perceived variation in the signaler’s uncertainty over the future costs at stake. We find that almost all indicators shape threat credibility and find suggestive support for the proposed mechanism. By bridging behavioral economics and foundational scholarship on costly signaling in international relations (IR) in novel ways, this registered report shows how individual and environmental decision restrictions set the bounds of observable leader rationality and, in turn, shape credibility in IR.
JOP 88/2 pp. 805-825 2026-04-01 Original Loss Framing in Territorial Disputes
Andi Zhou, Hein Goemans, Michael Weintraub
Abstract
No description supplied
中文 领土争端中的损失框定
Andi Zhou, Hein Goemans, Michael Weintraub
JOP 88/2 pp. 732-745 2026-04-01 Original Effects of Popular Legitimacy on International Organizations: An Elite Survey Experiment
Thomas Sommerer, Jonas Tallberg
Abstract
Whether or not popular legitimacy matters for international organizations (IOs) is a topic of extensive assumption but little rigorous research. A key obstacle has been the methodological difficulties of establishing legitimacy’s effect using observational data. This article offers the first experimental study of the effects of popular legitimacy on IOs. Theoretically, we propose that popular legitimacy affects IOs through the mechanism of government responsiveness to public opinion. Empirically, we test this expectation by presenting elected politicians in Sweden with a scenario of proposed reforms to the World Health Organization (WHO) and randomized information about the organization’s degree of popular legitimacy. The results show that higher levels of popular legitimacy made politicians more willing to confer additional authority and resources on the IO. The effects were particularly large among politicians with positive pretreatment attitudes toward the WHO and leftist ideological orientations. These findings suggest that popular legitimacy matters by affecting national decision-makers’ willingness to empower IOs.
JOP 88/2 pp. 526-540 2026-04-01 Original Do External Threats Reduce Affective Polarization? An Experiment on Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
JOP 88/2 pp. 772-786 2026-04-01 Original Arms and Elections: Arms Deals with Autocracies, Defense Contracting, and US Presidential Elections
Joshua Alley
Abstract
The United States makes more arms deals with autocracies during election years. US leaders sell arms to autocrats to bolster their electoral prospects by claiming credit for providing jobs and increasing defense contracting. Autocratic arms recipients have the political flexibility to order arms around elections and increase their security by taking arms. Three major pieces of evidence support this argument. First, I detail electoral cycles in arms deals between the United States and autocracies. I then show that arms deals increase defense contract awards in swing states. Finally, I unpack the process by showing how deal timing shifts after regime change, that US allies drive most of the autocratic arms deals cycle, and that the same platforms that move in arms deals increase swing state contracts. The argument and results detail an electoral motivation of US security cooperation with autocrats.
JOP — 2026-03-13
Original Rethinking Reputation: When Fighting to Demonstrate Resolve Backfires
Joshua A. Schwartz
Abstract
(原文未提供摘要)
中文 重新审视声誉:当为展示决心而成的斗争反噬自身
Joshua A. Schwartz
摘要
原文未提供摘要
关键词
声誉、决心、危机谈判、威慑、观众成本
DOI: 10.1086/741344
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APSR — pp. 1-18 2026-03-11 Original Exiting Russia
RACHEL L. WELLHAUSEN, BOLIANG ZHU
Abstract
As of February 24, 2022, over forty thousand foreign-invested firms operated in Russia, a host state that initiated an interstate war—an exceptional shock in the modern era of economic globalization. Using company registration data, we document that after 18 months of war, 33.3% of foreign-invested firms had changed ownership or become inactive. We conceptualize exit as a politicized transaction in which sellers and buyers face external pressures and bargain over terms. Concerning pressures to sell, those in consumer-oriented industries were more likely to exit. On bargaining, we find Russian state interests consequential: foreign-invested firms already under Russian managerial control were more likely to exit, whereas those in Russian strategic industries were not. Despite extraordinary economic sanctions to isolate Russia, and surging social backlash against doing business in Russia, results imply that multinationals are at best unstable tools of economic statecraft, even in the midst of war.