国际关系

CQ 266 pp. 291-308 2026-05-20 Original The Resilience of Self-reliance in China: Autonomy, Interdependence and Order-shaping Amy King, Wenting He Abstract Abstract The idea of “self-reliance” has endured in Chinese political discourse for nearly a century, transcending profound changes in China’s political, economic and strategic circumstances. Although it is frequently misinterpreted as economic isolation or autarky, the idea of self-reliance in China has always acknowledged the country’s engagement with the global economy. Drawing on the discursive institutionalist concept of ideational resilience, we show that self-reliance comprises three interlocking elements: autonomy, interdependence and order-shaping. While these sit in tension with one another, they have also accommodated one another since the earliest articulations of the idea. This tripartite structure has enabled Chinese leaders since the Republican era to reinterpret and usefully deploy the idea of self-reliance. Our findings underscore the resilience of Chinese foreign economic policy ideas, as well as the ideational logic behind Xi Jinping’s seemingly contradictory pursuit of technological self-reliance, open global markets and greater connectivity with the developing world.

AJPS — 2026-05-19 Original Breaking barriers: How an international treaty for women reduces the size of the informal economy Chris Gahagan Abstract Abstract Prior research on the role the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has improving women's outcomes has shown ratification results in increased political and social rights, yet no improvements in economic rights. I challenge prior findings by providing evidence that CEDAW improves women's economic rights by reducing gendered legal barriers to employment. I also demonstrate CEDAW has unexpected but desirable downstream consequences that further improve women's economic outcomes by facilitating movement from the informal to the formal economy. Through matching within a difference‐in‐differences design, I show ratifying countries experience a significant increase in women's equality of economic opportunity and a significant decrease in the size of the informal economy. These results hold under multiple robustness checks and placebo tests. By examining specific outcomes that are relevant to CEDAW, I offer greater insight into CEDAW's impact on women's economic outcomes than previous research has afforded.

JCC — pp. 1-18 2026-04-21 Original Diplomatic Bifurcation: China’s Dual Narratives on the Russia–Ukraine War in Global Times

JCC — pp. 1-15 2026-04-21 Original China Plans for ‘Total War’: Developing the Capacity to Defeat the ‘Strong Enemy’ of the United States

JCC — pp. 1-16 2026-04-08 Original China’s Quasi-Mediation Diplomacy in the Middle East in the 21st Century Mordechai Chaziza Abstract This study examines China’s quasi-mediation diplomacy in the Middle East as a limited form of conflict management. Rather than viewing mediation as dispute resolution, quasi-mediation is framed as a strategy for China to engage regionally while minimizing political and reputational risk. Through cases such as the 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement and China’s involvement in the Israel-Palestine conflict, the article argues that quasi-mediation allows China to signal responsible power, manage regional instability, and expand its diplomatic visibility, without taking on coercive leverage or implementation. The analysis reveals that China’s efforts are more about reputational signaling and risk management than conflict resolution. Ultimately, quasi-mediation reflects China’s global ambitions and the constraints of its non-interference policy in a multipolar world.

JOP 88/2 pp. 839-853 2026-04-01 Original Observable Bounds of Rationality and Credibility in International Relations Andrew Kenealy, Trent Ollerenshaw, So Jin Lee Abstract In crisis bargaining scenarios, resolved states send costly signals to demonstrate a willingness to fight. Yet, public signals of resolve are issued by specific leaders, who operate with cognitive limitations in challenging decision environments. Drawing upon theories of behavioral economics, we develop a series of observable indicators plausibly connected to leader ability and difficulty of decision environment that we expect shape perceived signaler credibility. Effects, we argue, are due to perceived variation in the signaler’s uncertainty over the future costs at stake. We find that almost all indicators shape threat credibility and find suggestive support for the proposed mechanism. By bridging behavioral economics and foundational scholarship on costly signaling in international relations (IR) in novel ways, this registered report shows how individual and environmental decision restrictions set the bounds of observable leader rationality and, in turn, shape credibility in IR.

JOP 88/2 pp. 805-825 2026-04-01 Original Loss Framing in Territorial Disputes Andi Zhou, Hein Goemans, Michael Weintraub Abstract （原文未提供摘要） 中文 领土争端中的损失框架 Andi Zhou, Hein Goemans, Michael Weintraub 摘要 原文未提供摘要 关键词 领土争端、损失框架、前景理论、损失厌恶、国际谈判 DOI: 10.1086/735452

JOP 88/2 pp. 732-745 2026-04-01 Original Effects of Popular Legitimacy on International Organizations: An Elite Survey Experiment Thomas Sommerer, Jonas Tallberg Abstract Whether or not popular legitimacy matters for international organizations (IOs) is a topic of extensive assumption but little rigorous research. A key obstacle has been the methodological difficulties of establishing legitimacy’s effect using observational data. This article offers the first experimental study of the effects of popular legitimacy on IOs. Theoretically, we propose that popular legitimacy affects IOs through the mechanism of government responsiveness to public opinion. Empirically, we test this expectation by presenting elected politicians in Sweden with a scenario of proposed reforms to the World Health Organization (WHO) and randomized information about the organization’s degree of popular legitimacy. The results show that higher levels of popular legitimacy made politicians more willing to confer additional authority and resources on the IO. The effects were particularly large among politicians with positive pretreatment attitudes toward the WHO and leftist ideological orientations. These findings suggest that popular legitimacy matters by affecting national decision-makers’ willingness to empower IOs.

JOP 88/2 pp. 526-540 2026-04-01 Original Do External Threats Reduce Affective Polarization? An Experiment on Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

JOP 88/2 pp. 772-786 2026-04-01 Original Arms and Elections: Arms Deals with Autocracies, Defense Contracting, and US Presidential Elections Joshua Alley Abstract The United States makes more arms deals with autocracies during election years. US leaders sell arms to autocrats to bolster their electoral prospects by claiming credit for providing jobs and increasing defense contracting. Autocratic arms recipients have the political flexibility to order arms around elections and increase their security by taking arms. Three major pieces of evidence support this argument. First, I detail electoral cycles in arms deals between the United States and autocracies. I then show that arms deals increase defense contract awards in swing states. Finally, I unpack the process by showing how deal timing shifts after regime change, that US allies drive most of the autocratic arms deals cycle, and that the same platforms that move in arms deals increase swing state contracts. The argument and results detail an electoral motivation of US security cooperation with autocrats.