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公共行政

Does level of government and messaging influence public evacuations? Examining public compliance and agency trust

PMR — pp. 1-23 2026-09-27 Original Does level of government and messaging influence public evacuations? Examining public compliance and agency trust Jaclyn Piatak, Colt Jensen Abstract Extreme weather events are increasing globally, yet research on how public leadership messaging and the level of government delivering crisis communications influence public compliance and institutional trust remains limited. Drawing on public leadership theory and federalism research, we employ a 2 × 3 survey experiment embedded in the 2023 US Cooperative Election Study (N = 409) to examine how messaging style (authoritarian versus democratic) and the level of government agency (federal, state, or local) influence evacuation intent and agency trust. We find that messaging from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) increases evacuation intent, despite local governments being legally responsible for issuing evacuation orders. Democratic, or collective, messaging is associated with greater trust in agency. However, trust is more strongly associated with pre-existing individual orientations, public service motivation, and political ideology, than with one-time communication cues. Findings have implications for crisis communication strategy, public leadership, and intergovernmental coordination in emergency management.

Artificial Intelligence, Bureaucratic Discretion, and Democratic Administration

PAR — 2026-09-27 Original Artificial Intelligence, Bureaucratic Discretion, and Democratic Administration L. Jason Anastasopoulos Abstract ABSTRACT Since the start of the COVID ‐19 pandemic, many countries have been using artificial intelligence ( AI ) to replace civil service personnel. We argue that this practice undermines core democratic values. Using the public values framework, we identify four clusters of values that are threatened when bureaucratic discretion is transferred to algorithms: accountability, fairness and equity, individual consideration, and reason‐giving. Each of these values is incompatible with how algorithms render decisions. Because algorithms produce outputs based on statistical regularities, they diffuse responsibility across multiple parties, fail to make accurate predictions about anomalous cases, and attenuate citizens' claims to individualized consideration. Thus, this article frames AI adoption as a constitutional question about which decisions can be automated, and which should remain under human control because they implicate democratic values. We propose a centaur model in which AI supports rather than replaces human officials, which can preserve efficiency while protecting democratic governance.

What Does Representation Represent? Disaggregating Demographic and Behavioral Components

PAR — 2026-09-24 Original What Does Representation Represent? Disaggregating Demographic and Behavioral Components Rachel (Soyeon) Cho Abstract ABSTRACT Representative bureaucracy research has often linked demographic representation directly to favorable outcomes, inferring active representation post hoc while rarely separating the behavioral component presumed to accompany such associations from the representation variable itself. This study addresses such gap by drawing on gender differences in leadership literature to operationalize supportive leadership as one behavioral component associated with female supervisory representation and examine the constituent elements of what has been interpreted as a representation effect. Using gender pay inequality across US federal agencies as the empirical context, the findings show that while both female supervisory representation and supportive leadership are each positively associated with nonsupervisory salaries when examined separately, the association attributed to representation loses significance once both are modeled together. These findings do not suggest that representation is unimportant; rather, they indicate that prior representation effects may partially reflect a behavioral component that has not been separately identified.

The Punitive Dimension of Presidential Particularism

APSR — pp. 1-11 2026-09-24 Original The Punitive Dimension of Presidential Particularism LUKAS K. ALEXANDER Abstract Existing accounts of presidential particularism emphasize the targeted distribution of benefits to electorally valuable constituencies. This research note demonstrates that presidential particularism can also operate punitively, through the selective imposition of costs on constituencies that provided weaker electoral support for the president. I examine this dynamic through the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), a highly centralized and politicized agency created at the start of Donald Trump’s second term. Leveraging data on nearly 700,000 federal contracts linked to DOGE contract cuts and 2024 county-level election returns, I show that these cuts were systematically concentrated in counties that provided weaker electoral support for Trump. These patterns hold across contract- and county-level analyses. Together, these findings broaden theories of presidential particularism by showing that presidents may use administrative authority to impose costs on electorally oppositional constituencies. More broadly, I demonstrate how presidents can wield administrative power as a tool of partisan punishment.