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公共行政

Do Government Interventions Improve Local Public Service Performance? Evidence From a Synthetic Control Approach

PA — 2026-03-02 Original Do Government Interventions Improve Local Public Service Performance? Evidence From a Synthetic Control Approach Rhys Andrews Abstract ABSTRACT Governments in many democratic countries have the mandate to require local authorities to address failures in the management and performance of the public services that they provide. Such policies often involve the takeover of authorities to implement improvements assumed to result in organizational turnaround. However, critics argue that locally‐directed change remains a more reliable means for achieving service transformation. To cast light on these issues, this paper applies a quasi‐experimental synthetic difference‐in‐differences approach to investigate whether partial takeovers of poorly‐performing education services in four Welsh local authorities in 2013 were effective in turning them around. The findings suggest that the establishment of independent recovery boards to oversee local education policy helped some of them to improve educational outcomes, but that local authorities were not always able to sustain improvements after the recovery boards were decommissioned. The study highlights that government interventions to improve local public service performance need to be focused on supporting long‐term organizational change.

Bureaucratic Incentives and Government Responsiveness in China

GOV 39/2 2026-03-02 Original Bureaucratic Incentives and Government Responsiveness in China Haemin Jee Abstract ABSTRACT Citizen complaints have long been considered an important channel of communication between citizens and officials in authoritarian regimes. Existing explanations for responsiveness to citizen complaints in China, however, do not adequately consider the role of local bureaucratic incentives as a driver of responsiveness. This paper seeks to explain local government responsiveness to citizen demands through this lens. Original data of citizen complaints and government responses from a Chinese prefecture and its subordinate counties demonstrate that lower level officials are more likely to respond to citizen complaints when monitored by their superiors. On the other hand, they are less responsive on unmonitored forums. Thus, oversight by higher level officials may be important in increasing actual government responsiveness; citizen complaints alone may not be enough to spur government action. While recent studies emphasize authoritarian accountability arising through quasi‐democratic institutions, this paper suggests incentives of local political actors may condition the effectiveness of these institutions.