PMR — pp. 1-25 2026-03-04 Original Alleviating or aggravating? How patronage ties moderate the impacts of performance feedback on data manipulation in public performance management
PA — 2026-03-02
Original Do Government Interventions Improve Local Public Service Performance? Evidence From a Synthetic Control Approach
Rhys Andrews
Abstract
ABSTRACT Governments in many democratic countries have the mandate to require local authorities to address failures in the management and performance of the public services that they provide. Such policies often involve the takeover of authorities to implement improvements assumed to result in organizational turnaround. However, critics argue that locally‐directed change remains a more reliable means for achieving service transformation. To cast light on these issues, this paper applies a quasi‐experimental synthetic difference‐in‐differences approach to investigate whether partial takeovers of poorly‐performing education services in four Welsh local authorities in 2013 were effective in turning them around. The findings suggest that the establishment of independent recovery boards to oversee local education policy helped some of them to improve educational outcomes, but that local authorities were not always able to sustain improvements after the recovery boards were decommissioned. The study highlights that government interventions to improve local public service performance need to be focused on supporting long‐term organizational change.
GOV 39/2 2026-03-02
Original Bureaucratic Incentives and Government Responsiveness in China
Haemin Jee
Abstract
ABSTRACT Citizen complaints have long been considered an important channel of communication between citizens and officials in authoritarian regimes. Existing explanations for responsiveness to citizen complaints in China, however, do not adequately consider the role of local bureaucratic incentives as a driver of responsiveness. This paper seeks to explain local government responsiveness to citizen demands through this lens. Original data of citizen complaints and government responses from a Chinese prefecture and its subordinate counties demonstrate that lower level officials are more likely to respond to citizen complaints when monitored by their superiors. On the other hand, they are less responsive on unmonitored forums. Thus, oversight by higher level officials may be important in increasing actual government responsiveness; citizen complaints alone may not be enough to spur government action. While recent studies emphasize authoritarian accountability arising through quasi‐democratic institutions, this paper suggests incentives of local political actors may condition the effectiveness of these institutions.
PMR — pp. 1-36 2026-03-01 Original Variance risk, downside risk, and tail risk: comparing risk behaviours among public and private sector employees
Reona Hayashi, So Morikawa, Takeshi Ojima, Manami Tsuruta
PMR — pp. 1-24 2026-02-28 Original How punishment avoidance motivation inhibits prohibitive voice behaviour: the role of blame risk and occupational reputation
Shenghao Guo, Zijing Wu, Chuanshen Qin
PAR 86/5 pp. 1478-1491 2026-02-27 Original Beyond Psychological Costs: How Negative Bureaucratic Encounters Influence Citizens' General Psychological Well‐Being