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公共行政

Understanding Resourcing Trade-Offs in International Organizations: Evidence from an Elite Survey Experiment

JOP 88/3 pp. 1231-1244 2026-07-01 Original Understanding Resourcing Trade-Offs in International Organizations: Evidence from an Elite Survey Experiment Mirko Heinzel, Bernhard Reinsberg, Christian Siauwijaya Abstract International organizations (IOs) are mandated to address some of the most important global challenges under intense budget scarcity. In recent years, they expanded their funding base through a greater reliance on earmarked voluntary contributions by member states and nonstate actors. Critics warn that earmarked funding creates an important trade-off: IOs can do more with earmarked funding but have less control over what they do and do it less well. In this registered report, we probe how staff evaluate different types of earmarking through a novel elite survey experiment with staff from six United Nations organizations. We show that staff prefer earmarking for their own area of work over other types of earmarking. However, these preferences do not affect the funding amount they deem as appropriate or the overheads they expect their organization to charge. Our study provides important insights for debates on the resourcing of IOs and the motivations of international bureaucrats.

An Agency Perspective on Immigration Federalism

JOP 88/3 pp. 983-997 2026-07-01 Original An Agency Perspective on Immigration Federalism Asya Magazinnik Abstract American local law enforcement agencies now engage in an unprecedented degree of cooperation with the federal government to police immigration in the nation’s interior. I argue that this regime of “cooperative federalism” in immigration enforcement is an intentional and strategic use of the federal executive’s authority. Drawing insight from the bureaucratic agency literature, I develop a formal model that analyzes the president’s decision to invite subnational participation in policymaking. An empirical analysis of the 287(g) program highlights the model’s central trade-off. By deputizing local officers with the powers of Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, 287(g) allowed willing local participants to share the costs of enforcement with federal authorities. But the localities that selected into the program were preference outliers who wielded their newfound agency differently from their federal counterparts: Rather than using the immigration system to help police felonies, they deployed the criminal justice system to police immigration.

Interagency collaboration, broker organization, and bureaucratic responsiveness: how public agencies fix complex citizen requests on digital government platforms?

PMR — pp. 1-25 2026-06-30 Original Interagency collaboration, broker organization, and bureaucratic responsiveness: how public agencies fix complex citizen requests on digital government platforms? Yao Liu, Wenting Yang

Forged through forces: configurations to digital policy attention in local governments

PMR — pp. 1-29 2026-06-29 Original Forged through forces: configurations to digital policy attention in local governments Tao Wang, Chen Zhong, Ge Wang, Liumiao Qin Abstract Although governments’ digital policy attention is pivotal for effective digital governance, the mechanisms shaping attention remain insufficiently understood. Drawing on an integrated view of institutional environment, task environment, and resource endowment, we analyse 272 Chinese prefecture-level cities using a hybrid fsQCA – regression method to examine how multiple conditions jointly shape attention to digital transformation. We find that normative pressure, fiscal capacity, economic conditions, and digital infrastructure provide the foundation for high policy attention. Beyond this base, we identify three configurations across these dimensions: capability alignment, where leaders with technocratic backgrounds and digital culture jointly foster endogenous commitment; pressure compliance, where coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures jointly drive policy attention; and peer learning adaptation, where governments enhance attention through horizontal emulation when top-down mandates are weak. Regression analyses show that pressure compliance exerts the strongest influence on digital policy attention. These findings reveal configurational dynamics underlying digital governance.