PAR — 2026-06-19
Original Selection Method, Partisanship, and Performance of Government Oversight Functions
Lang (Kate) Yang
Abstract
ABSTRACT This study examines how the selection of public sector leaders affects organizational outcomes, especially in oversight functions where independence is expected. Political economy literature suggests that elected leaders better respond to voter preferences, while appointed leaders possess more expertise. Drawing on public administration theories of political control of the bureaucracy, we posit that, regardless of the selection method, public sector leaders as agents are subject to the influence of political principals with authority over the selection process. When the principal's interest is not aligned with the public interest, as seen in government oversight functions, its influence could compromise the performance of the selected leaders. Focusing on state auditors, the study finds that on average, selection methods are not correlated with audit findings, but an auditor whose political principal shares the same party affiliation as the auditee (the state governor) is less likely to identify financial management deficiencies.
GOV 39/3 2026-06-19
Original How Centralization Benefits Public Provision and Local Political Trust: The Case of Taiwan
Matthew Yi‐Hsiu Lee
PMR — pp. 1-34 2026-06-16 Original When boards look like women: gender representation and women’s services in China’s social work organizations
JPART — 2026-06-15
Original Mapping the temporal evolution of causal effects in public administration and policy research
Lefteris Jason Anastasopoulos, Inkyu Kang
Abstract
Abstract Recent growth in the use of randomized and quasi-experiments in public administration and policy research has advanced the ability to establish cause-and-effect relationships. However, many studies adopt static conceptions of causality, focusing on snapshots or time-averaged effects while overlooking how the effects change over time. This oversight is problematic, as interventions of scholarly interest, such as leadership training or the adoption of new technologies, are likely to produce impacts that unfold in various ways. In this paper, we propose a conceptual framework for understanding the temporal dynamics of causal effects and their implications for research hypotheses and design. We then introduce Bayesian changepoint models (BCMs) as a methodological tool for detecting shifts in the average, variance, or trend of causal effect series, providing a more rigorous yet accessible alternative to visually inspecting graphs. Next, we demonstrate the application of BCMs with an illustrative example derived from simulation data as well as a real-world case examining the effect of body-worn cameras on police officers’ use of force. Finally, we discuss how examining temporal changes in effects can advance theoretical understanding of why and how they occur, as well as inform the design and implementation of policies and strategies in practice.
PMR — pp. 1-34 2026-06-14 Original Anchoring during a storm: unveiling the role of Anchor institutions in place-based public service ecosystems during disruption
Gabriella Pica, Sarah Russo, Daniela Sorrentino
PMR — pp. 1-31 2026-06-12 Original Co-creation in commissioning complex public services: towards an adaptive system for continuous improvement
Taina Schneider, Harri Raisio, Anniina Tirronen, Harri Jalonen
PSJ — 2026-06-11
Original Shaping Collaborative Actions in Self‐Initiated Versus Mandated Collaborations
PMR — pp. 1-28 2026-06-11 Original Did populist governance change corruption risks during crises across European countries?
Giuliana Ioannidis
Abstract
This study examines whether populist governance shaped public procurement corruption risks during COVID-19 across 23 EU Member States. Despite common emergency rules, corruption risks varied markedly. Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis and the Corruption Risk Index, the study finds that populist governance combined with poor integrity norms is sufficient to explain high corruption risk increases. Populist-led governments intensify risks by undermining oversight, exploiting legal loopholes, and legitimizing rule-breaking through anti-elite narratives, particularly where accountability cultures are weak. Anti-corruption strategies must therefore account for crisis conditions and politicized governance, ensuring independent oversight mechanisms remain intact under populist rule.
PMR — pp. 1-32 2026-06-09 Original Improving non-executive directors’ judgement quality through information provision: a mixed-method study
PMR — pp. 1-33 2026-06-08 Original Unleashing the potential of participative budgeting practices in Public Healthcare Organizations: The drivers of psychology-based budgeting research
Domenico Raucci, Manuela Paolini, Nicoletta Cera, Fausto Di Vincenzo