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公共行政

Playing with time: data manipulation within the performance evaluation cycle

·711 字·2 分钟
Polihot 公共行政 政治经济学 中国研究 Performance Gaming Data Manipulation Bureaucratic Calendar China Nighttime Lights
JPART — 2026-07-06 Original Playing with time: data manipulation within the performance evaluation cycle Jiayuan Li, Zhibin Chen, Manqian Cui, Xuelian Zhang Abstract Abstract Understanding why public organizations manipulate performance data has become an essential theme in public administration scholarship. While prior research has extensively explored the individual and contextual drivers of gaming, the temporal dimension—specifically when manipulation occurs—remains remarkably underexplored. Moving beyond the impact of sporadic political events, this study examines the routine, institutionalized rhythms of the bureaucratic calendar. Utilizing satellite nighttime light data as an objective benchmark to detect distortion in officially reported GDP across 271 Chinese cities (2013–2020), we uncover a systematic, cyclical pattern of strategic gaming. Manipulation is substantial in the first quarter, consistent with political pressure for a “good start,” recedes during the middle of the year; and surges to its annual peak in the fourth quarter (Q4) as the final performance assessment looms. Furthermore, we show that this Q4 effect is contingent on local context: cities with lower fiscal autonomy and reduced marketization exhibit a significantly greater propensity to inflate year-end figures. By uncovering a routine form of manipulation embedded in bureaucratic practices, our study advances theories of performance gaming and sheds light on the strategic use of time in public management.

The promise and performance of social impact bonds

·465 字·1 分钟
Polihot 公共行政 公共政策 Social Impact Bonds Public Management Accountability Outcomes Measurement Public-Private Partnerships
PMR — pp. 1-30 2026-07-02 Original The promise and performance of social impact bonds Clare J. FitzGerald, Alec Fraser, Carolyn J. Heinrich, Mikkel Munksgaard Andersen Abstract This article examines social impact bonds (SIBs), first scrutinizing early discourse on their promises—increased accountability through competitive public-private partnerships, outcomes measurement, and a learning approach to performance management—drawing on theories of New Public Management and New Public Governance. Then, a structured review of empirical research is used to evaluate SIB performance against their public management reform promises. Findings show that while SIBs sometimes foster intersectoral collaboration, they can also surface power imbalances, institutionalize gaming, and inadvertently reduce public accountability. A faltering commitment to robust outcomes measurement is also demonstrated, with negative implications for effective governance and public value.

Organizational strategies for system robustness: how managers navigate the institutional architecture of complex systems

·766 字·2 分钟
Polihot 公共行政 Institutional Design System Robustness Organizational Strategy Information Processing Water Governance
JPART — 2026-07-02 Original Organizational strategies for system robustness: how managers navigate the institutional architecture of complex systems Adam Wiechman, Aaron Deslatte, Elizabeth A Koebele, Margaret Garcia, John M Anderies

Understanding Resourcing Trade-Offs in International Organizations: Evidence from an Elite Survey Experiment

·574 字·2 分钟
Polihot 国际关系 公共行政 International Organizations Earmarked Funding Elite Survey Experiment UN Organizations International Bureaucracy
JOP 88/3 pp. 1231-1244 2026-07-01 Original Understanding Resourcing Trade-Offs in International Organizations: Evidence from an Elite Survey Experiment Mirko Heinzel, Bernhard Reinsberg, Christian Siauwijaya Abstract International organizations (IOs) are mandated to address some of the most important global challenges under intense budget scarcity. In recent years, they expanded their funding base through a greater reliance on earmarked voluntary contributions by member states and nonstate actors. Critics warn that earmarked funding creates an important trade-off: IOs can do more with earmarked funding but have less control over what they do and do it less well. In this registered report, we probe how staff evaluate different types of earmarking through a novel elite survey experiment with staff from six United Nations organizations. We show that staff prefer earmarking for their own area of work over other types of earmarking. However, these preferences do not affect the funding amount they deem as appropriate or the overheads they expect their organization to charge. Our study provides important insights for debates on the resourcing of IOs and the motivations of international bureaucrats.