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公共行政

A Model of Agency Behavior in Participatory Budgeting: A Resource Dependence Perspective

JPART — 2026-09-08 Original A Model of Agency Behavior in Participatory Budgeting: A Resource Dependence Perspective Seunghyun Kim Abstract Abstract Based on resource dependence theory, this article theorizes why government agencies adopt citizen proposals in participatory budgeting. Agencies depend on the executive budget office and the legislature for budget approval, which makes them face uncertainty in securing budgets from these political principals. In this context, agencies can adopt citizen proposals to present their requests as reflecting citizen demands, thereby increasing the probability of approval. Building on this logic, this study argues that the greater the uncertainty agencies face in their dependencies on principals, the more likely they are to depend on proposals. This argument is tested using multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression based on citizen proposals (N = 3,609) submitted through Korea’s national participatory budgeting initiative from 2020 through 2023. The results show that agencies with less financial support from the legislature or those with smaller budgets are more likely to adopt proposals, as they face greater uncertainty due to unstable budgetary flows or fewer response options to manage resource instability. Agencies are also more likely to adopt proposals when they previously secured greater funding through proposal adoption, but this effect weakens for larger-budget agencies or those receiving greater legislative support. These findings emphasize the strategic nature of proposal adoption and the role of resource dependence in agency responses to proposals.

A fish rots from the head down: unpacking the trickle-down effect of leaders’ unethical pro-organizational behaviour (UPB) in the Chinese public sector

PMR — pp. 1-27 2026-09-08 Original A fish rots from the head down: unpacking the trickle-down effect of leaders’ unethical pro-organizational behaviour (UPB) in the Chinese public sector

Dead Ends and Policy Change in Chinese Experimental Governance

GOV 39/4 2026-09-04 Original Dead Ends and Policy Change in Chinese Experimental Governance Vincent Brussee Abstract ABSTRACT Not all policy change is expansive, yet non‐expansive trajectories remain underexamined. This article introduces the concept of dead ends: a stage of the policy process in which initiatives cease to develop or be implemented in their existing form, structuring subsequent policy change such as rollback, redirection, or termination. To examine such trajectories, the article combines large‐scale analysis of 27,103 policy experiments announced in the People's Republic of China between 2013 and 2018 with qualitative case studies. The findings suggest that a substantial majority—up to 90%—of experiments reach dead ends. These dead ends are associated with leadership turnover, policy complexity, and misalignment with bureaucratic incentives and socio‐economic conditions. Altogether, the article provides new frameworks for understanding alternative directions of policy change. In doing so, it also sheds new light on the adaptive capacity and structural constraints of China's governance system.