PSJ 54/3 2026-08-03
Original It Does Matter. A New Framework on the Influence of Policy Evaluation
Pirmin Bundi, Valérie Pattyn
PAR — 2026-08-02
Original Does Political Decoupling Through Fair Market Privatization Improve Managerial and Political Outcomes? Insights From Water Utility Sales
Jesse L. Barnes, Michael A. Powell
PAR — 2026-08-02
Original A Race to the Top: The Adoption of Net‐Zero City Pledges in Large US Cities
PAR — 2026-07-31
Original Social Capital and Policy Compliance in a Polarized Democracy: A Necessary Condition Analysis of COVID Vaccination Rates Across US Counties
JCC — pp. 1-19 2026-07-31 Original Poverty in Urban China 2012–2020: Applying an Income-Asset Joint Framework
PAR — 2026-07-29
Original The Matthew Effect in American Generosity? Philanthropic Disparities and the Role of Government Support
Viviana Chiu Sik Wu, Ji Ma, Chao Guo
GOV 39/4 2026-07-29
Original Legislative Pork‐Barrel Funding and Public Policy Outcomes: The Role of Local‐Level Factors
JPART — 2026-07-28
Original Institutionalized enforcement of administrative compliance: state regulator use of noncompliance burdens
Mingxu (Emma) Li, Daniel L Fay
Abstract
Abstract Administrative burden scholarship typically examines rules and regulations affecting access to public benefits during initial citizen–state interactions. Scholars agree that individual burdens function as “hidden politics” because policy changes during implementation through bureaucratic discretion. Less is known about bureaucratic behavior or hidden politics enforced on third-party service providers maintaining compliance. In this article, we address this by examining noncompliance burdens imposed on abortion providers to understand if regulators emulate peers’ behavior. Using an institutional theoretical framework and administrative records from the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (FAHCA) on abortion provider oversight, we construct a directed dyadic event history model using 1540 dyad-year observations to predict isomorphism or divergence of sanction activities across regulatory field offices. We find that regulatory field offices emulate behavior of others based on peer’s previous sanction behavior and oversight workload. We also find that regulators diverge from peers based on the regulatory conditions of their own jurisdiction.
PAR — 2026-07-27
Original Linking Decision Roles to Knowledge Utilization in US State Governments: A Mixed‐Method Study
PNAS 123/31 pp. e2618096123-e2618096123 2026-07-27 Original ICE arrests, 2015–2026: Variation in targeting, method, and geography
Chloe N. East, Caitlin Patler, Elizabeth Cox