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中国研究

Bureaucratic Incentives and Government Responsiveness in China

·524 字·2 分钟
Polihot 公共行政 比较政治 中国研究 Bureaucratic Incentives Government Responsiveness Citizen Complaints Authoritarian Accountability China
GOV 39/2 2026-03-02 Original Bureaucratic Incentives and Government Responsiveness in China Haemin Jee Abstract ABSTRACT Citizen complaints have long been considered an important channel of communication between citizens and officials in authoritarian regimes. Existing explanations for responsiveness to citizen complaints in China, however, do not adequately consider the role of local bureaucratic incentives as a driver of responsiveness. This paper seeks to explain local government responsiveness to citizen demands through this lens. Original data of citizen complaints and government responses from a Chinese prefecture and its subordinate counties demonstrate that lower level officials are more likely to respond to citizen complaints when monitored by their superiors. On the other hand, they are less responsive on unmonitored forums. Thus, oversight by higher level officials may be important in increasing actual government responsiveness; citizen complaints alone may not be enough to spur government action. While recent studies emphasize authoritarian accountability arising through quasi‐democratic institutions, this paper suggests incentives of local political actors may condition the effectiveness of these institutions.

From Pricing Power to Autonomy: The Geopolitics of RMB-Denominated Oil Futures Benchmark

·491 字·1 分钟
Polihot 国际关系 政治经济学 中国研究 RMB Oil Futures Financial Statecraft Pricing Power Oil Benchmarks China
JCC — pp. 1-18 2026-02-27 Original From Pricing Power to Autonomy: The Geopolitics of RMB-Denominated Oil Futures Benchmark Alexandru-Stefan Goghie Abstract This article examines China’s introduction of RMB-denominated crude oil futures as an instrument of financial statecraft aimed at reshaping the geopolitical foundations of global oil pricing. While Brent and WTI dominate price discovery through their deep embedding in dollar-based financial infrastructures, China seeks to cultivate pricing power by relocating benchmark formation to domestic institutions and an RMB-denominated contract. The paper argues that this initiative is not merely a market innovation, but a strategic effort to reduce structural dependence on USD-centered benchmarks, mitigate exposure to US financial jurisdiction, and enhance autonomy amid intensifying geopolitical rivalry. By analyzing the architecture, evolution, and international uptake of the Shanghai INE contract, the article shows that pricing power constitutes a crucial and underexplored dimension of contemporary Chinese statecraft.