Original
Limits on Terms, Limits on Control: The Effect of Chief Executive Term Limits on Bureaucratic Responsiveness
Abstract
ABSTRACT Term limits for elected officials are often advocated to enhance responsiveness to constituents. We argue however, that they can weaken executive power by reducing bureaucratic deference. Using an experimental survey of state bureaucrats across nine U.S. states, we investigate the impact of gubernatorial term limits on bureaucratic effort and prioritization of executive preferences. Our findings reveal that bureaucrats exert less effort and place lower importance on the preferences of term‐limited governors compared to those at the beginning of their term or running for re‐election. However, these effects are modest in size, suggesting that while gubernatorial term limits create space for bureaucrats to afford executives less deference, the degree to which they ultimately shirk is limited. Our findings highlight the unique ways in which term limits affect elected executives and that term limits affect not only how the officials subject to them represent the public, but also how others in government interact with them.
中文
任期限制、控制限制：行政首长任期限制对官僚回应性的影响
摘要
对民选官员的任期限制常被主张用以增强其对选民的回应性。然而，我们认为，任期限制可能通过减少官僚的服从而削弱行政权力。我们利用一项覆盖美国九个州州级官僚的实验性调查，考察州长任期限制对官僚努力程度及对行政首长偏好优先排序的影响。我们的发现显示，与任期刚开始或正竞选连任的州长相比，官僚在任期受限州长领导下付出更少努力，并更不重视其偏好。然而，这些效应规模不大，这表明尽管州长任期限制为官僚减少对行政首长的服从创造了空间，他们最终敷衍的程度仍然有限。我们的发现凸显了任期限制影响民选行政首长的独特方式，并且任期限制不仅影响受其约束的官员如何代表公众，也影响政府中其他人如何与其互动。
关键词
任期限制、官僚回应性、行政权力、州长任期限制、官僚服从、调查实验、美国州政治、官僚努力