跳过正文
  1. 政治学英文顶刊消息速递/
  2. 论文时间线/

Repeated Modifications in Policy Diffusion: Evidence From River Management Regulations in China's Cities

PSJ 54/2

2026-03-10

Original

Repeated Modifications in Policy Diffusion: Evidence From River Management Regulations in China's Cities

Hu Xi, Hongtao Yi

Abstract

ABSTRACT Why do local governments repeatedly modify policies after their initial adoption? While policy diffusion research has focused on adoption, far less is known about why and how policies are revised over time. This study analyzes a city–year dataset of 293 Chinese prefecture‐level cities from 1986 to 2022, tracking both the adoption and subsequent modifications of River Management Regulations (RMR). A two‐stage modeling strategy combining a Probit model and a Prentice–Williams–Peterson Cox model is employed to analyze repeated modifications. The findings reveal three patterns. First, policy modifications at the provincial level and amendments to superior laws significantly increase the likelihood of local RMR revisions, whereas central‐level modifications do not exert a direct effect. Second, while neighboring jurisdictions' policy modifications do not significantly affect local revisions, adoption by neighboring late adopters generates a positive effect, indicating a form of “reverse diffusion.” Third, policies issued by local legislative branches are more likely to be modified than those issued by executive agencies, highlighting the role of institutional structure and procedural constraints. By shifting attention from adoption to repeated modification, this study extends policy diffusion theory and contributes to a broader understanding of post‐adoption policy dynamics in hierarchical and decentralized political systems.

中文

政策扩散中的重复修改:来自中国城市河流管理法规的证据

Hu Xi, Hongtao Yi

摘要

为什么地方政府在初始采纳后会反复修改政策?尽管政策扩散研究一直关注采纳问题,但人们对政策为何以及如何随时间推移而被修订知之甚少。本研究分析1986—2022年中国293个地级市的城市—年份数据集,追踪《河流管理法规》(RMR)的采纳及后续修改。研究采用结合Probit模型与Prentice–Williams–Peterson Cox模型的两阶段建模策略来分析重复修改。研究发现揭示了三种模式。第一,省级层面的政策修改以及上级法律的修订显著提高了地方RMR被修订的可能性,而中央层面的修改则没有直接效应。第二,相邻辖区的政策修改并未显著影响地方修订,但相邻后采纳者的采纳会产生正向效应,表明存在一种“反向扩散”。第三,由地方立法机关发布的政策比由行政机关发布的政策更可能被修改,凸显了制度结构与程序约束的作用。通过将关注点从采纳转向重复修改,本研究拓展了政策扩散理论,并有助于更广泛地理解层级化与分权化政治体系中的后采纳政策动态。

关键词

政策扩散、政策修改、重复修改、河流管理法规、地方政府、中国、后采纳政策动态、反向扩散