Original
The policy construction of illegal markets: Exploring variation, success, failure, and unintended consequences
Abstract
Illegal markets, broadly defined to include markets where only specific transactions are illegal, are the consequence of policy, either a prohibition or highly restrictive regulation. They are generated by a variety of concerns, some moral, some pragmatic. They are often tied to legal markets, complicating the policy process. These markets are ubiquitous, rarely well controlled and little studied as markets. This article examines variations in illegality from the case studies in this Special Feature and synthesizes what can be learned about the success and failure of different approaches to controlling these markets. Control is often weak because powerful legal interests are opposed to tight regulation and, especially in markets with large underlying demand, rarely leads to substantial reductions in the targeted activity, unless draconian methods are used. As demonstrated by drug markets, tough enforcement can have large adverse collateral consequences. The paper concludes by suggesting that an extension of the harm reduction framework developed specifically for drug policy can be applied usefully to making policy choices in controlling other illegal markets.
中文
非法市场的政策建构：探究变异、成功、失败与意外后果
摘要
非法市场——广义上包括仅特定交易为非法的市场——是政策的产物，或源于禁止，或源于高度限制性监管。它们由多种关切所催生，其中一些是道德性的，一些是实用性的。它们常常与合法市场紧密相连，这使政策过程变得复杂。这些市场无处不在，却很少得到良好控制，且作为市场鲜有研究。本文考察本专题案例研究中非法性的差异，并综合梳理在控制这些市场的不同路径的成功与失败方面所能获得的启示。控制往往薄弱，因为强大的合法利益集团反对严格监管；而且，尤其是在具有巨大潜在需求的市场中，除非采用严厉手段，控制很少能显著减少目标活动。正如毒品市场所表明的，严厉执法可能带来严重的负面附带后果。本文最后提出，将专为毒品政策制定的减少危害框架加以扩展，可有益地应用于其他非法市场控制中的政策选择。
关键词
非法市场、政策建构、禁止、限制性监管、减少危害、执法、附带后果、毒品市场