Original
The money laundering market: An economic analysis
Abstract
Criminals launder their proceeds from crime, either themselves or by paying a professional, to disguise the link between the criminal, the crime, and the proceeds. This allows the criminal to spend the proceeds more freely and lowers the chance of receiving unwanted attention from the authorities. This paper investigates the structure and dynamics of the understudied market for money laundering services. The analysis reveals that this illegal market is demand-driven and fragmented, with different forms of laundering, each requiring different steps with varying levels of risk. High search costs, specialized money launderers, and uncertainties lead to local monopolies. Demand tends to be relatively inelastic because criminals eventually need laundering services to spend their proceeds. Local monopolies, inelastic demand, and poor information flows lead to relatively high prices for laundering. Trust issues and two-sided asymmetric information lead to a market with relationships that tend to last longer than generally expected in illegal markets.
中文
洗钱市场：一项经济分析
摘要
犯罪分子会亲自或通过付费雇佣专业人士来清洗其犯罪所得，以掩盖犯罪者、犯罪与所得收益之间的联系。这使犯罪分子能够更自由地使用这些收益，并降低引起当局不必要关注的可能性。本文考察了研究不足的洗钱服务市场的结构与动态。分析表明，这一非法市场由需求驱动且呈碎片化，存在不同的洗钱形式，每种形式都需要不同步骤并伴随不同程度的风险。高昂的搜寻成本、专业化的洗钱者以及不确定性导致地方垄断。需求往往相对缺乏弹性，因为犯罪分子最终需要洗钱服务才能使用其收益。地方垄断、缺乏弹性的需求以及不畅的信息流动导致洗钱价格相对较高。信任问题与双向信息不对称导致该市场中的关系往往比通常对非法市场的预期持续更久。
关键词
洗钱市场、经济分析、非法市场、市场结构、信息不对称、需求驱动、地方垄断、犯罪收益