Original
Escalation of commitment in the public sector: the impacts of electoral effects and visualization aids on blame avoiding behavior
Abstract
Our study examines why economically failing public projects are often irrationally terminated too late. Furthermore, we study how this phenomenon known as escalation of commitment (EoC) can be mitigated by visualization aids. Drawing on self-justification theory and blame avoidance theory, our experiment with 283 elected politicians shows that politicians escalate significantly stronger before elections than afterwards. However, visualization aids can counteract escalation even before elections. Our findings contribute to the literature of blame avoidance and the performance information use literature by using escalation literature to identify a factor of ‘motivational change’ by politicians to counteract psychological and/or strategic misbehaviour.
中文
公共部门中的承诺升级：选举效应与可视化辅助对避责行为的影响
摘要
本研究考察了为何经济上失败的公共项目往往被非理性地过晚终止。此外，我们研究如何通过可视化辅助来缓解这一被称为承诺升级（EoC）的现象。基于自我辩护理论与避责理论，我们对283名民选政治人物进行的实验表明，政治人物在选举前比选举后显著更强地出现承诺升级。然而，可视化辅助即使在选举前也能抵消这种升级。我们的发现通过运用承诺升级文献识别出政治人物的一种“动机变化”因素，以对抗心理性和/或策略性不当行为，从而为避责文献和绩效信息使用文献作出贡献。
关键词
承诺升级、公共部门、选举效应、可视化辅助、避责行为、自我辩护理论、绩效信息使用、公共项目