Original
Investor Orientation and Commitment in Outcomes‐Based Public Service Contracts
Abstract
ABSTRACT Outcomes‐based contracts (OBCs) organize public service delivery around measurable results, yet little is known about how different investors engage with these instruments. This article examines how investor orientation (social, financial, or dual‐purpose) shapes investor commitment in OBCs worldwide. Drawing on a global dataset of 338 contracts, we combine descriptive analyses, regression models, and qualitative interviews to investigate how investor orientation relates to investment scale. We hypothesize that OBCs involving socially oriented investors are associated with higher levels of investment than those involving financially or dual‐purpose investors. Consistent with this prediction, socially oriented investors consistently commit larger amounts, whereas financially oriented and dual‐purpose investors typically participate with smaller contributions. These patterns challenge a central premise of OBCs: that such instruments would mobilize significant mainstream private capital for public services. Interview evidence points to reputational risks, limited familiarity with local conditions, and outcome measurement complexity as key deterrents.
中文
结果导向型公共服务合同中的投资者导向与承诺
摘要
摘要：结果导向型合同（OBCs）围绕可衡量的结果来组织公共服务供给，但人们对不同投资者如何参与这些工具仍知之甚少。本文考察投资者导向（社会导向、财务导向或双重目的）如何影响全球OBCs中的投资者承诺。基于涵盖338份合同的全球数据集，我们结合描述性分析、回归模型和定性访谈，研究投资者导向与投资规模之间的关系。我们假设，涉及社会导向投资者的OBCs比涉及财务导向或双重目的投资者的OBCs具有更高的投资水平。与这一预测一致，社会导向投资者始终承诺更大金额，而财务导向和双重目的投资者通常以较小出资参与。这些模式挑战了OBCs的一个核心前提：此类工具将为公共服务动员大量主流私人资本。访谈证据表明，声誉风险、对当地情况了解有限以及结果测量的复杂性是关键阻碍因素。
关键词
结果导向型合同、公共服务合同、投资者导向、投资承诺、社会导向投资者、私人资本、公共服务供给、合同治理