Original
Improving Cooperation in Government Purchasing Through Formal‐Relational Contracting
Abstract
ABSTRACT A central challenge in government contracting is fostering cooperation between buyers and sellers where contract terms are incomplete. This article introduces a framework for formal‐relational contracting (FRC) in public sector contexts, where rigid regulations, competing values, and market imperfections make cooperation both difficult and valuable. FRC promotes cooperation through contract terms defining shared goals, guiding principles, and governance mechanisms. We present the theoretical foundations of FRC and examine its potential through 320 government contract management decision simulations where public contract managers acted as government buyers and business sellers facing sequential choices under both FRC contracts and the more conventional formal contracting approach. The results show that FRC increased managers' cooperative behavior by around 30 percentage points compared to formal contracting. Qualitative evidence further suggests that FRC shifted managers' mindsets from adversarial to cooperative. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for how FRC can enhance cooperation and mutual value in government contracting.
中文
通过正式—关系型契约改善政府采购中的合作
摘要
政府采购合同中的一个核心挑战是，在合同条款不完整的情况下促进买卖双方之间的合作。本文提出一个适用于公共部门情境的正式—关系型契约（FRC）框架；在公共部门中，刚性规制、相互竞争的价值以及市场不完善使合作既困难又有价值。FRC 通过界定共同目标、指导原则和治理机制的合同条款来促进合作。我们阐述 FRC 的理论基础，并通过 320 个政府合同管理决策模拟检验其潜力。在模拟中，公共合同管理者分别扮演政府买方和企业卖方，在 FRC 合同与更传统的正式合同路径下面临序贯选择。结果表明，与正式合同相比，FRC 使管理者的合作行为提高了约 30 个百分点。定性证据进一步表明，FRC 使管理者的心态从对抗性转向合作性。我们讨论 FRC 如何能够增强政府采购合同中的合作与共同价值，及其理论和实践意涵。
关键词
政府采购、正式—关系型契约、合作、合同管理、公共部门、治理机制、决策模拟、合作行为