Original
Selection Method, Partisanship, and Performance of Government Oversight Functions
Abstract
ABSTRACT This study examines how the selection of public sector leaders affects organizational outcomes, especially in oversight functions where independence is expected. Political economy literature suggests that elected leaders better respond to voter preferences, while appointed leaders possess more expertise. Drawing on public administration theories of political control of the bureaucracy, we posit that, regardless of the selection method, public sector leaders as agents are subject to the influence of political principals with authority over the selection process. When the principal's interest is not aligned with the public interest, as seen in government oversight functions, its influence could compromise the performance of the selected leaders. Focusing on state auditors, the study finds that on average, selection methods are not correlated with audit findings, but an auditor whose political principal shares the same party affiliation as the auditee (the state governor) is less likely to identify financial management deficiencies.
中文
选拔方式、党派性与政府监督职能的绩效
摘要
本研究考察公共部门领导人的选拔如何影响组织结果，尤其是在本应保持独立性的监督职能中。政治经济学文献表明，民选领导人更能回应选民偏好，而任命产生的领导人拥有更多专业知识。借鉴公共行政学中关于对官僚体系进行政治控制的理论，我们提出，无论采用何种选拔方式，作为代理人的公共部门领导人都会受到对选拔过程拥有权威的政治委托人的影响。当委托人的利益与公共利益不一致时——正如政府监督职能中的情形——其影响可能损害被选拔领导人的绩效。本研究以州审计师为对象，发现平均而言，选拔方式与审计发现并无相关性；但如果审计师的政治委托人与其被审计对象（州长）属于同一党派，该审计师更不可能识别出财务管理缺陷。
关键词
公共部门领导人选拔、政治控制、党派性、政府监督、州审计师、审计绩效、委托-代理、官僚控制