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How Was Democracy Under the Administrative Presidency Supposed to Work?

PAR 86/5 pp. 1225-1234 2026-05-19

Original

How Was Democracy Under the Administrative Presidency Supposed to Work?

Ben Merriman

Abstract

ABSTRACT Aggressive use of the administrative power of the presidency is a major source of public administrative concern about the health of American democracy. Many of these powers stem from executive branch reorganization in the late 1930s, which was conceived and implemented by founding figures in the modern field. Fear for democracy defined reorganization. Reorganizers elaborated a working theory about the conditions under which strong presidential administration could preserve and strengthen democracy: structured internal friction in the executive branch to recreate traditional checks on administrative conduct; identification and promotion of a corps of socially and politically astute administrators; and a watchful Congress. This design relied on a political approach to administration that created few managerial or legal safeguards. As subsequent polarization has altered the political order under which executive reorganization was conceived, the institutional powers of the presidency have emerged as a threat to democratic arrangements, rather than a bulwark.

中文

行政总统制下的民主本应如何运作?

Ben Merriman

摘要

摘要:积极运用总统的行政权力,是公共行政学界对美国民主健康状况产生担忧的一个主要根源。这些权力中的许多源自20世纪30年代末的行政部门重组,该重组由现代领域的奠基人物构想并实施。对民主的担忧界定了这场重组。重组者阐发了一种运作理论,说明在何种条件下强有力的总统行政能够维护并加强民主:在行政部门内部构建结构性的内部摩擦,以再现对行政行为的传统制衡;识别并提拔一支具有社会与政治敏锐性的行政人员队伍;以及一个保持警觉的国会。这一设计依赖于一种对行政的政治性取径,几乎未创设管理或法律上的保障。随着后续的政治极化改变了行政部门重组得以构想时所处的政治秩序,总统职位的制度性权力已逐渐成为对民主安排的威胁,而非其堡垒。

关键词

行政总统制、总统行政、行政部门重组、美国民主、政治极化、公共行政