Original
Conditional Compliance: The Role of Sector and Policy Design in State Sexual Misconduct Policy
Abstract
Abstract The role of principal-agent dynamics in performance and accountability reforms has been a recurring theme in public administration research. Yet, less attention has been dedicated to how the intersection of sector and policy design shapes principal-agent dynamics and subsequent policy outcomes. This study theoretically explores and empirically tests how sector and policy design shape the effects of state legislation that seeks to prevent shirking (mismanagement and underreporting) in the context of sexual misconduct outcomes in U.S. colleges and universities. We code every state policy designed to regulate higher education institutions’ management of sexual misconduct from 2007 to 2018 in the U.S. and leverage a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood with a staggered difference-in-differences design to identify the effects. Our findings suggest that both sector and policy design matter: public institutions increase reporting in response to prevention policies that promote education and awareness, but prevention policies have no effect on private institutions. Other policies regulating enforcement and infrastructure produce null effects across both sectors. These findings have important implications for principal-agent theory and policy design research on effective methods for reducing shirking in social equity, accountability, and performance reporting.
中文
有条件的遵从：部门与政策设计在州级性行为不端政策中的作用
摘要
摘要 主代理动态在绩效与问责改革中的作用一直是公共行政研究反复出现的主题。然而，较少有研究关注部门与政策设计的交汇如何塑造主代理动态及随后的政策结果。本研究从理论上探讨并实证检验部门与政策设计如何塑造旨在防止卸责（管理不善与少报）的州立法的影响，背景是美国高校性行为不端结果。我们编码了2007年至2018年美国所有旨在规制高等教育机构对性行为不端管理的州政策，并利用泊松伪最大似然估计结合交错双重差分设计来识别效应。我们的发现表明，部门和政策设计均起作用：公立机构会因促进教育与意识提升的预防政策而增加报告，但预防政策对私立机构没有影响。其他规制执行与基础设施的政策在两个部门均产生零效应。这些发现对主代理理论以及关于减少社会公平、问责和绩效报告中的卸责的有效方法的政策设计研究具有重要意义。
关键词
主代理理论、政策设计、部门差异、性行为不端、高等教育、州政策、合规、问责