Original
Institutionalized enforcement of administrative compliance: state regulator use of noncompliance burdens
Abstract
Abstract Administrative burden scholarship typically examines rules and regulations affecting access to public benefits during initial citizen–state interactions. Scholars agree that individual burdens function as “hidden politics” because policy changes during implementation through bureaucratic discretion. Less is known about bureaucratic behavior or hidden politics enforced on third-party service providers maintaining compliance. In this article, we address this by examining noncompliance burdens imposed on abortion providers to understand if regulators emulate peers’ behavior. Using an institutional theoretical framework and administrative records from the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (FAHCA) on abortion provider oversight, we construct a directed dyadic event history model using 1540 dyad-year observations to predict isomorphism or divergence of sanction activities across regulatory field offices. We find that regulatory field offices emulate behavior of others based on peer’s previous sanction behavior and oversight workload. We also find that regulators diverge from peers based on the regulatory conditions of their own jurisdiction.
中文
行政合规的制度化执行：州监管者对不合规负担的运用
摘要
行政负担研究通常考察在公民与国家初始互动中影响公共福利获取的规则和规章。学者们一致认为，个体负担发挥着“隐蔽政治”的作用，因为政策在执行过程中通过官僚自由裁量权发生变化。对于加诸维持合规的第三方服务提供者的官僚行为或隐蔽政治，学界了解较少。本文通过考察加诸堕胎服务提供者的不合规负担，来理解监管者是否会模仿同侪行为。我们运用制度理论框架以及佛罗里达州卫生保健管理局（FAHCA）关于堕胎服务提供者监管的行政记录，构建了一个有向二元事件史模型，使用1540个二元-年份观测值，预测各监管现场办公室制裁活动的同构或分化。我们发现，监管现场办公室会基于同侪先前的制裁行为和监管工作量来模仿其他机构的行为。我们还发现，监管者会基于自身辖区的监管条件而与同侪分化。
关键词
行政负担、不合规负担、监管执法、官僚自由裁量权、制度同构、第三方服务提供者、合规、堕胎服务监管