Original
Playing with time: data manipulation within the performance evaluation cycle
Abstract
Abstract Understanding why public organizations manipulate performance data has become an essential theme in public administration scholarship. While prior research has extensively explored the individual and contextual drivers of gaming, the temporal dimension—specifically when manipulation occurs—remains remarkably underexplored. Moving beyond the impact of sporadic political events, this study examines the routine, institutionalized rhythms of the bureaucratic calendar. Utilizing satellite nighttime light data as an objective benchmark to detect distortion in officially reported GDP across 271 Chinese cities (2013–2020), we uncover a systematic, cyclical pattern of strategic gaming. Manipulation is substantial in the first quarter, consistent with political pressure for a “good start,” recedes during the middle of the year; and surges to its annual peak in the fourth quarter (Q4) as the final performance assessment looms. Furthermore, we show that this Q4 effect is contingent on local context: cities with lower fiscal autonomy and reduced marketization exhibit a significantly greater propensity to inflate year-end figures. By uncovering a routine form of manipulation embedded in bureaucratic practices, our study advances theories of performance gaming and sheds light on the strategic use of time in public management.
中文
与时间博弈：绩效评估周期中的数据操纵
摘要
理解公共组织为何操纵绩效数据，已成为公共行政学研究的重要主题。既有研究广泛探讨了博弈行为的个体与情境驱动因素，但时间维度——即操纵在何时发生——仍显著未得到充分研究。本研究超越偶发性政治事件的影响，考察官僚日历中常规化、制度化的节律。我们利用卫星夜间灯光数据作为客观基准，检测271个中国城市（2013—2020年）官方报告GDP中的失真，揭示了系统性、周期性的策略性博弈模式。操纵在第一季度较为显著，与追求“开门红”的政治压力相一致；在年中回落；并随着最终绩效评估临近，在第四季度（Q4）飙升至年度峰值。此外，我们表明这种第四季度效应取决于地方情境：财政自主权较低、市场化程度下降的城市，年末数据虚报的倾向显著更高。通过揭示一种嵌入官僚实践中的常规化操纵形式，本研究推进了绩效博弈理论，并阐明了公共管理中时间的策略性运用。
关键词
绩效数据操纵、绩效评估周期、策略性博弈、官僚日历、夜间灯光数据、地方政府、财政自主权、市场化