Original
Political Power of Bureaucratic Agents: Evidence from Policing in New York City
Abstract
To what extent can bureaucrats manipulate public service provision for explicitly political ends? Existing research highlights the ability of bureaucrats to influence governments through campaign contributions, endorsements, and election turnout. I explore a more fundamental mechanism: bureaucrats strategically shirking responsibil ities to leverage voters. Politicians rely on bureaucrats to achieve policy goals, which grants bureaucrats considerable leverage. When bureaucrats deviate in preferences from politicians and are politically organized and independent, they can reduce ef fort to exert political pressure. I use data on New York Police Department (NYPD) 911 response times and council members’ preferences on the FY2021 $1 billion cut to the NYPD’s budget. Employing difference-in-differences and spatial difference-in discontinuities designs, I find that police disproportionately reduced effort in districts of misaligned politicians by slowing response times. This study informs the theoretical debate on principal-agent relationships in government and highlights the importance of organized political interests to explain policing in US cities.
中文
官僚代理人的政治权力：来自纽约市警务的证据
摘要
官僚能在多大程度上为明确的政治目的操纵公共服务供给？现有研究强调了官僚通过竞选捐款、背书和选举投票率影响政府的能力。我探讨一种更根本的机制：官僚策略性地推卸责任以利用选民。政治人物依赖官僚实现政策目标，这赋予官僚相当大的筹码。当官僚的偏好与政治人物不一致，且政治上组织化并具有独立性时，他们可以通过减少努力来施加政治压力。我使用纽约市警察局（NYPD）911响应时间的数据以及市议员对2021财年削减NYPD 10亿美元预算的偏好。采用双重差分和空间差分断点设计，我发现，在政治人物立场不一致的选区，警察通过放慢响应时间不成比例地减少了努力。本研究有助于政府内部委托—代理关系的理论辩论，并凸显有组织的政治利益对于解释美国城市警务的重要性。
关键词
官僚政治、警务、委托—代理关系、公共服务供给、纽约市、响应时间、双重差分、政治压力