Original
Soft Power as Constituency Cultivation
Abstract
How do foreign agents, representing countries or other political actors, exert influence in another country? While scholars have directed considerable theoretical and empirical attention toward “hard power” (e.g., coercion [explicit or implicit] and corruption/bribery), far less consideration has been devoted to understanding the theoretical mechanisms associated with “soft” channels of political influence. We develop a novel theory of soft power as constituency cultivation whereby an actor (government or firm) makes a targeted investment in a foreign society with the objective of creating greater policy alignment among a set of politically relevant actors (the policy selectorate). We consider two factors that influence constituency cultivation, preexisting interest congruence and coordination (e.g., focal points), and extend our model to include corruption and other forms of bribery. We show how the potential for corruption/bribery can enhance the benefits from soft power, implying that corruption and soft power are complementary forms of influence.
中文
作为选区培育的软实力
摘要
代表国家或其他政治行为体的外国代理人如何在他国施加影响？尽管学者们对“硬实力”（例如显性或隐性的胁迫，以及腐败/贿赂）投入了大量理论与实证关注，但对于与“软”政治影响渠道相关的理论机制的理解却远为不足。我们提出一种新的软实力理论，即软实力作为选区培育：行为体（政府或企业）对外国社会进行有针对性的投资，目标是在一组具有政治相关性的行为体（政策选择集团）中形成更大的政策一致性。我们考察影响选区培育的两个因素——既有利益一致性与协调（例如焦点），并将模型扩展至包含腐败和其他形式的贿赂。我们表明，腐败/贿赂的可能性可以提升软实力带来的收益，这意味着腐败与软实力是互补的影响形式。
关键词
软实力、选区培育、外国影响、政治影响、腐败、贿赂、政策选择集团、协调