Cutting in Line: How Powerful Organized Interests Hasten and Delay Executive Branch Nominations

Original

Cutting in Line: How Powerful Organized Interests Hasten and Delay Executive Branch Nominations

Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Dino P. Christenson, Lauren Ratliff Santoro, Elizabeth Steffensmeier

Abstract

Despite the potential to shape policy in every domain of government, organized interests have not been central to discussions of the nomination process for bureaucratic appointments. We test measures of the quantity of interest group opposition and support for nominees as well as the power of groups on nomination outcomes and duration. Using an original data set of interest involvement in nominations from the 106th to 115th Congresses, we find that powerful interests affect the timing of executive branch nominations for confirmation and return. Interests weigh in on nominations when the stakes are high, and legislators heed the call of the most powerful groups over the sheer number of groups. The influence of interests in the committee stage is similar but limited. Our analysis shows that organized interests affect the bureaucracy before nominees make it to office by speeding up or slowing down their time to confirmation, return, or withdrawal.