Original
Observable Bounds of Rationality and Credibility in International Relations
Abstract
In crisis bargaining scenarios, resolved states send costly signals to demonstrate a willingness to fight. Yet, public signals of resolve are issued by specific leaders, who operate with cognitive limitations in challenging decision environments. Drawing upon theories of behavioral economics, we develop a series of observable indicators plausibly connected to leader ability and difficulty of decision environment that we expect shape perceived signaler credibility. Effects, we argue, are due to perceived variation in the signaler’s uncertainty over the future costs at stake. We find that almost all indicators shape threat credibility and find suggestive support for the proposed mechanism. By bridging behavioral economics and foundational scholarship on costly signaling in international relations (IR) in novel ways, this registered report shows how individual and environmental decision restrictions set the bounds of observable leader rationality and, in turn, shape credibility in IR.
中文
国际关系中理性与可信度的可观察边界
摘要
在危机讨价还价情境中，意志坚定的国家会发送代价高昂的信号，以表明其战斗意愿。然而，关于决心的公开信号是由具体领导人发出的，而这些领导人在具有挑战性的决策环境中会受到认知限制的约束。借鉴行为经济学理论，我们开发了一系列可观察指标，这些指标可能与领导人的能力以及决策环境的困难程度相关，我们预期它们会塑造人们对信号发出者可信度的感知。我们认为，这些效应源于人们所感知到的信号发出者对未来所涉成本的不确定性的差异。我们发现，几乎所有指标都会影响威胁的可信度，并找到了对所提出机制的提示性支持。通过以新颖的方式连接行为经济学与国际关系（IR）中关于代价高昂信号的基础性研究，这份注册报告表明，个体与环境层面的决策限制如何界定了可观察的领导人理性的边界，并进而塑造了国际关系中的可信度。
关键词
国际关系、危机讨价还价、代价高昂信号、信号可信度、领导人理性、行为经济学、威胁可信度、注册报告