Original
Arms and Elections: Arms Deals with Autocracies, Defense Contracting, and US Presidential Elections
Abstract
The United States makes more arms deals with autocracies during election years. US leaders sell arms to autocrats to bolster their electoral prospects by claiming credit for providing jobs and increasing defense contracting. Autocratic arms recipients have the political flexibility to order arms around elections and increase their security by taking arms. Three major pieces of evidence support this argument. First, I detail electoral cycles in arms deals between the United States and autocracies. I then show that arms deals increase defense contract awards in swing states. Finally, I unpack the process by showing how deal timing shifts after regime change, that US allies drive most of the autocratic arms deals cycle, and that the same platforms that move in arms deals increase swing state contracts. The argument and results detail an electoral motivation of US security cooperation with autocrats.
中文
武器与选举：与威权政体的军火交易、国防承包与美国总统选举
摘要
美国在选举年会与威权政体达成更多军火交易。美国领导人向威权统治者出售武器，以通过宣称提供了就业机会并增加了国防承包来提升其选举前景。威权武器接收国拥有政治灵活性，可在选举前后订购武器，并通过获取武器来增强自身安全。三条主要证据支持这一论点。首先，我详细描述了美国与威权政体之间军火交易的选举周期。接着，我表明军火交易会增加摇摆州的国防合同授予。最后，我剖析这一过程，展示政权更迭后交易时机如何变化，美国盟友推动了大部分威权军火交易周期，以及军火交易中流动的同类平台会增加摇摆州合同。该论点与结果详细说明了美国与威权统治者安全合作中的选举动机。
关键词
军火交易、威权政体、国防承包、美国总统选举、摇摆州、选举周期、安全合作