Executive–Legislative Policymaking Under Crisis

Original

Executive–Legislative Policymaking Under Crisis

Nathaniel A. Birkhead, Jeffrey J. Harden, Jason H. Windett

Abstract

Does conventional wisdom explain policymaking during a domestic crisis on a novel issue? We consider executive–legislative interactions in the American states during the COVID-19 pandemic to address problems in the study of unilateral executive action. Empirical analyses of crisis policymaking often examine wartime presidents or localized natural disasters but confront difficulties in identifying the status quo policy. COVID-19 created a large-scale domestic crisis and a status quo that was known with relative certainty. We develop a canonical theoretical account of executive–legislative interaction and test it using COVID-19 executive orders issued and legislation introduced and passed during 2020 to 2022. Results show that governors’ proposals met expectations, but legislatures’ responses did not. Instead, partisanship and ideological factors, which crystallized over time, largely determined legislative policy choices. We conclude that standard theory does not adequately account for preference dynamics that might emerge due to delays between the executive’s proposal and the legislature’s response.