Original
Intraparty Competition, Geographic Responsiveness, and Incumbent Deselection in Closed-List Proportional Representation
Abstract
Closed-list proportional representation is considered to produce politicians engaged in programmatic, party-oriented behavior. Personal vote-seeking and geographic responsiveness, however, are attributed to open-list or plurality systems. In this article, I argue that the focus on interparty competition masks incentives for geographic responsiveness generated by intraparty competition for nominations. Specifically, parties’ candidate selection methods that rely on locally minded delegates introduce incentives for incumbents to engage in localized responsiveness. Using survey experiments with party delegates in Germany and an original and novel dataset based on (historical) nomination protocols of the German Green party in combination with geo-referenced legislative behavior, I show that geographically responsive incumbents are preferred by delegates in survey experiments, rewarded with higher ranks and vote margins in the observational data, and that this is mainly limited to men who face greater competition. My findings shed new light on the interplay of electoral and selectoral incentives for behavior.
中文
封闭式名单比例代表制下的党内竞争、地理回应性与现任者去选
摘要
封闭式名单比例代表制被认为会塑造出从事纲领性、以政党为导向行为的政治家。然而，个人选票寻求与地理回应性通常被归因于开放式名单制或多数决制。本文认为，对政党间竞争的关注掩盖了提名中的党内竞争所产生的地理回应性激励。具体而言，依赖具有地方主义倾向的代表进行候选人遴选的政党方法，会为现任者引入参与地方化回应性的激励。利用在德国对政党代表开展的调查实验，以及一个基于德国绿党（历史）提名协议并结合地理编码立法行为的原创且新颖数据集，我表明：在调查实验中，地理回应性更强的现任者更受代表青睐；在观察数据中，他们获得更高的名单排名和得票优势；并且这一现象主要限于面临更大竞争的男性。我的发现为选举激励与候选人遴选激励在行为中的相互作用提供了新的认识。
关键词
党内竞争、地理回应性、现任者去选、封闭式名单比例代表制、候选人遴选、个人选票、德国绿党、调查实验