Filtered Policy Implementation: Evidence from Rural China

Original

Filtered Policy Implementation: Evidence from Rural China

Suyuan He, Weiye Wang

Abstract

Through tracing incidents of agricultural product looting, this paper reveals the political logic behind local governments’ paradoxical behavior of promoting farmland scaling-up while marginalizing smallholders under the potential political threat of deviating from central directives. This dilemma stems from the evolution of bureaucratic evaluation arrangements and broader societal changes. Under increasing pressure on target assessments and supervision, local governments resort to measures including exploiting smallholders’ welfare to fulfil compulsory agricultural production targets, despite the fact that both production and welfare are two-fold of the integral goal of the state’s strategy. These practices have led to the collapse of traditional agricultural communities and heightened conflicts between local residents and nonlocal large-scale producers, reshaping grassroots agrarian production patterns profoundly and irreversibly.