Original
The Political Economy of Local Government Debt Expansion in China
Abstract
Since the 1990s, China has strengthened the Communist Party of China’s leadership over local People’s Congresses through a dual-appointment system, under which Party secretaries also serve as chairpersons of People’s Congresses. This article argues that this system enhances Party influence over legislative decision-making while further reducing institutional constraints, enabling local Party secretaries to pursue career-oriented agendas such as borrowing for infrastructure to boost economic growth. Under a growth-first development paradigm, this arrangement has fueled the rapid expansion of local government debt. Overall, these findings offer a political economy explanation for the dynamics of local government debt in China, and underscore the importance of stronger legal and institutional constraints on the dual-appointment system to mitigate local fiscal risks.
中文
中国地方政府债务扩张的政治经济学
摘要
自20世纪90年代以来，中国通过“双重任命”制度加强了中国共产党对地方人民代表大会的领导，在这一制度下，党委书记同时担任人大常委会主任。本文认为，这一制度增强了党对立法决策的影响力，同时进一步削弱了制度性约束，使地方党委书记能够追求以职业晋升为导向的议程，例如通过借债开展基础设施建设以推动经济增长。在增长优先的发展范式下，这种安排助推了地方政府债务的迅速扩张。总体而言，这些发现为理解中国地方政府债务动态提供了一种政治经济学解释，并凸显了对“双重任命”制度施加更强法律和制度约束以缓释地方财政风险的重要性。
关键词
地方政府债务、政治经济学、双重任命、地方人民代表大会、党委书记、财政风险、经济增长、制度约束