Original
Social Norms, State Punishment, and Motivation Crowding in Anti‐Corruption Messaging: Experimental Evidence From China
Abstract
ABSTRACT A growing body of scholarship views corruption not merely as a failure of monitoring and enforcement but as a resilient informal institution sustained by social perceptions—and misperceptions. When citizens believe others tolerate or engage in corruption, resisting it becomes a collective action problem, allowing corruption to perpetuate itself. Using a large‐scale survey experiment in China, this study tests whether correcting exaggerated perceptions of social tolerance for corruption can help break this cycle. We find that providing information about the actual (low) level of tolerance significantly strengthens anti‐corruption attitudes and intentions, especially among those who mistakenly believed a majority tolerated corruption. However, this effect is weakened when paired with punishment cues, suggesting that enforcement information can crowd out the motivational force of norm‐based messages. Our findings demonstrate both the potential and the limits of norm‐based informational interventions and offer implications for anti‐corruption messaging in comparable contexts.
中文
社会规范、国家惩罚与反腐败宣传中的动机挤出：来自中国的实验证据
摘要
摘要 越来越多的学术研究认为，腐败不仅是监督与执法的失败，还是一种由社会认知——以及错误认知——所维系、具有韧性的非正式制度。当公民认为他人容忍或参与腐败时，抵制腐败就成为一个集体行动问题，从而使腐败得以自我延续。本研究在中国开展了一项大规模调查实验，检验纠正被夸大的社会腐败容忍度认知是否有助于打破这一循环。我们发现，提供关于实际（较低）容忍水平的信息会显著增强反腐败态度与意图，尤其是在那些误以为多数人容忍腐败的人当中。然而，当与惩罚线索同时呈现时，这一效应会被削弱，这表明执法信息可能挤出规范类信息的激励力量。我们的发现既展示了基于规范的信息干预的潜力，也揭示了其局限，并为类似情境下的反腐败宣传提供了启示。
关键词
社会规范、国家惩罚、动机挤出、反腐败宣传、调查实验、中国、腐败容忍度、集体行动