Senior Bureaucrats, Coalitions and the Quality of Government: Accounting for Effective Governance in Fragmented Settings

Original

Senior Bureaucrats, Coalitions and the Quality of Government: Accounting for Effective Governance in Fragmented Settings

André Borges, Arnaldo Mauerberg

Abstract

ABSTRACT Debates over the consequences of party and cabinet fragmentation for government performance remain unsettled. While some scholars argue that coalition governments foster instability and rent‐seeking, others contend that they enhance accountability and inclusion. This article argues that the effects of cabinet fragmentation depend on the rules of recruitment and promotion of the senior civil service. Using data from the Quality of Government Expert Survey covering 89 democracies, we examine how fragmentation interacts with both bureaucratic politicization and bureaucratic career systems. The results show that fragmentation amplifies the negative effects of politicized senior appointments, although we find limited evidence that fragmentation itself reduces the quality of government under high politicization. By contrast, fragmented cabinets are associated with more effective governance in the presence of career‐based structures characterized by internal recruitment of senior bureaucrats and long‐term careers. The findings highlight the importance of bureaucratic career structures for effective governance in multiparty systems.